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The author traces the common thread running through the
analysis of judicial review by the symposium speakers. He posits
that while all three speakers support equally activist positions,
their allegiance to divergent values and political theories results
in their opposed statements on the activist debate. He compares
the dialogue in this symposium to that of the Justices in the
1940's, which discourse explicitly was grounded in a struggle over
values. The author concludes that courts must structure the form
of their opinions in a manner which clearly demonstrates the
relationship between the chosen social values and the resulting
decision.
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" "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less." ' "
-Burger, C.J. (1978)t
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all." '
-Frankfurter, J. (1948)1t
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B., Georgetown
University, 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974. The author wishes to express appreciation
for helpful commentary to colleagues Pat Gudridge, Dennis Lynch and Alan Swan, and to
research assistants Linda Furman and Richard Warner, and for their thoroughness and genu-
ine improvements, the editors and staff of the Law Review.
t TVA v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2291 n.18 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (quoting L. CARROLL,
Through the Looking-Glass, in LOGICAL NONSENSE 205 (1934) [hereinafter cited as LOGICAL
NONSENSE]).
tt Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 43 n.5 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(quoting LOGICAL NONSENSE supra note t, at 205).
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I. INTRODUCTION: "WHEN I USE A WORD"
Twice during the last term,' Supreme Court Justices hurled
Lewis Carroll' at a brother Justice for inventing statutory construc-
tions with which they disagreed. Certainly, the motivation behind
the familiar accusations provokes little surprise. The accusers per-
ceived that the judiciary had displaced another, more appropriate,
policymaker by abusing the linguistic interpretation necessary in
the judicial function. Little more appears remarkable in the selec-
tion of literary epithet.3 Indeed, the debate over the propriety of
judicial autonomy in its decisionmaking function may be ever-
present, and the recourse to childhood favorites periodic. However,
the selection of Humpty Dumpty's wisdom chosen by Justices
Burger and Frankfurter as their respective foils should arouse more
curiosity, for the passages themselves symbolize a difference in the
periods of time within which these men wrote. Chief Justice Burger,
in 1978, implied that Humpty Dumpty and those who think like the
egg are unfit to assume judicial robes; Justice Frankfurter, in 1948,
implied only that the judge, like the egg, should not lose his or her
balance from bench or wall. In the contexts from which the quota-
tions are taken, it appears that more than literary taste underlies
the distinction in selections. Justice Frankfurter's judges must con-
sciously refrain from overreaching their sphere of mastery; they can-
not deny that their actions can only be chosen by individuals with
subjective perceptions of reality.' Chief Justice Burger assumed that
1. TVA v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2291 n.18 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); Adamo Wrecking Co. v.
Bell, 98 S. Ct. 566, 572 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.).
2. Lewis Carroll was the nom de plume of Charles Dodgson. While Carroll maintained
that his books "meant" nothing, he once remarked: "Still, you know, words mean more than
we mean to express when we use them; so a whole book ought to mean a great deal more
than the writer means." ASPECTS OF ALcE xxi (R. Phillips ed. 1971). More recently, however,
some critics have come to regard Carroll's works as an antiestablishment commentary. Id. at
xxii.
3. For a few instances in which Supreme Court Justices have alluded to or relied upon
the words of Humpty Dumpty to support their arguments, see TVA v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279,
2291 n.18 (1978); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. Bell, 98 S. Ct. 566, 572 (1978); Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 435 n.6 (1968) (quoting 55 CALIF. L. REv. 592, 594-95 n.10 (1967)) (comparing a
leading Soviet jurist's construction of a statute with Humpty Dumpty's advice on the use of
words).
4. Justice Frankfurter stated his view thusly:
Construction, no doubt, is not a mechanical process and even when most scrupu-
lously pursued by judges may not wholly escape some retrospective infusion so
that the line between interpretation and substitution is sometimes thin. But there
is a difference between reading what is and rewriting it. The Court here does not
adhere to the text but deletes and reshapes it. Such literary freewheeling is hardly
justified by the assumption that Congress would have so expressed it if it had
given the matter attentive consideration.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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courts possess a method or benchmark enabling them to discharge
their decisionmaking function divorced from personal proclivities.5
The Justice of thirty years earlier faced the pitfalls of linguistic
argument and divined only the need to justify his power to reach his
conclusions, while the Justice of today perceives the same manipu-
lation of language as political interloping and as an occasion to
imitate the Red Queen.' Perhaps this difference of statement marks
Chief Justice Burger's attempt to learn from his perception of the
errors of the past. Whether that is his intention or not, the progres-
sion from Frankfurter to Burger obscures an insight into the judicial
process which Justice Frankfurter recognized and Chief Justice
Burger overlooked. Burger masks the actual workings of the judicial
institution by defining an artificial and impossible ideal role for
those who would be judges.
The Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series pres-
ents a contemporary opportunity to examine the judicial role and
the differences in judicial norm implied by Justices Burger and
Frankfurter. While the topic may suggest that modem society as-
sumes the necessity of some litigation over individual rights, none
of the speakers treated as entirely settled the appropriate occasions
for conducting adversary proceedings. On the surface, their differ-
ences reflect divergent assumptions about the degree of necessity for
and utility of judicial framing of social policy. No speaker began by
assuming that judges always make policy-that the techniques
which set policy within the interpretation of law and the justifica-
tion of policies thus authored were more interesting than the aged
question of "judicial activism." One speaker, Justice Rehnquist,
denied an intention to address "activism," although the assump-
tions implicit in his presentation logically lead toward a position on
the issue.
Since the topic of judicial activism continues to dominate legal
consciousness after more than thirty years of argument, one imme-
diately wonders whether the judicial statements of an earlier day,
like Justice Frankfurter's rehearsal of Carroll's tale, were also two
lines ahead of the discussion at this symposium.7 Perhaps the ne-
5. This assumption is implicit in Chief Justice Burger's statement that: "Our individual
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute." TVA v. Hill, 98 S. Ct.
2279, 2302 (1978).
6. The Red Queen's universal panacea was: "Off with his head." E.g., LOGMAL NON-
SENSE, supra note t, at 119.
7. See note 93 and accompanying text infra. Justice Frankfurter's selection of Humpty
Dumpty's wisdom immediately follows the sentence chosen by Chief Justice Burger in the
Carroll story.
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cessity to construct a new workable judicial methodology to meet
the shifting social and political demands occasioned by the "Great
Depression" forced Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues to a closer
experience of the essential craft of judgment. Perhaps public pres-
sure for new interpretations of legal text sensitized justices, already
under public scrutiny in the aftermath of Roosevelt's Court-Packing
Plan, to an acute awareness of the limits of justifiable interpretation
and to an emphasis on justification in their decisions. But more
than the recovery of the perspective of a more sensitive past era,
perhaps any resort to Lewis Carroll points to a deeper concern than
that intended by Justices Frankfurter and Burger. Ultimately of
greater significance than the difference between Justices Burger and
Frankfurter in their brief examination, through the words of
Humpty Dumpty, of the propriety of broad, "active" interpretation,
the opportunities of language about which Humpty Dumpty pontifi-
cated to Alice suggest that the "activism" debate misleads those
who engage in it by the simplifying assumptions of its very terms.'
The debate assumes that judges can minimize the degree of their
interpretation of legal text and, therefore, that the notion of "a little
bit of interpretation" has some conceptual significance. Unlike the
Justices who quote him, Humljty Dumpty lectures Alice that the
question of interpretation must be the potential meaning of the text
and not the meaningless notion of the degree of interpretive exer-
cise. In judicial opinions, any controversial judgment, from charac-
terizing a factual report to reading precedent, from statutory con-
struction to constitutional interpretation, embodies phenomena
transformed into a set of symbols, a linguistic form suitable for legal
reasoning. As if caught precariously under a judging glass, dynamic
experience, life, forced into static word pictures squirms while each
justice, with his or her subjective focus, strives to determine the
positioning of the glass.
The overarching object of inquiry in this comment is to expli-
cate the metaphor, the judging glass: to take its measure from dif-
ferent angles, as if turning the glass to catch the changing light; to
determine the centrality of its functioning to the judicial institution.
Methodologically, the argument will always proceed at simul-
taneous levels. While the search for the judging glass constitutes the
unifying theme of this comment, there are three different angles of
view progressively focused on the glass which are presented in sepa-
rate sections of the article and which can be read independently as
8. See Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense of the Adversary Process-a Reply to
Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MiLmi L. REv. 43 (1978).
[Vol. 33:59
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well. These three subordinate themes: (1) explain the common rela-
tionship among the three symposium participants, concluding that
only Judge Friendly passes beyond the traditional argument about
activism and suggesting the reasons for Justice Rehnquist's and
Professor Tribe's less fruitful focus; (2) compare Justice Rehnquist's
and Professor Tribe's disagreement to the modern beginnings of the
judicial activism debate in the 1940's through the vehicle of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette' in order to recover
an earlier model of the judiciary; and (3) suggest that clarity and
improved decisionmaking would result from recapturing one of the
unanswered problems left by the 1940's statement of the debate,
specifically, the need to explain and justify the level of generality
with which the situation and interests of the litigants are trans-
formed into legal propositions or putative rights. 0 Read together,
the subordinate themes assert that correct understanding of the
Humpty Dumpty metaphor eliminates the empty epithet of activ-
ism and identifies the judging glass as the touchstone of judicial
method. When judges exercise their role of pronouncing
"judgment," when they operate as appropriate "masters" of their
craft, they simultaneously justify the making of social policy inher-
ent in the interpretation of legal standards and explain the manipu-
lation of the facts taken by them to represent the underlying dis-
pute. Judges as individuals may decide to terminate litigations on
the basis of gut reaction, random chance, political payoffs, formal
deductions or their breakfast menus; judges as judges arbitrate the
meaning and thus the values a society at any given point will dis-
cover in the society's notion of law.
The interesting question for the Third Annual Baron de Hirsch
Meyer Lectures should have been the adequacy of the social values
articulated through this judicial process, not the degree of govern-
mental activity identified as intrusion into another actor's domain.
This commentary puzzles about this failure and the legal, political
and social assumptions behind the foregone opportunity to move
beyond the activism debate.
As a commentary, the article engages in speculation more than
it proclaims any tightly proven propositions or final definitions. The
shortcuts, overstatements and hindsights which result from these
speculations surely cheat the main speakers of the same luxury of
selective focus. However, their indulgence and that of the reader will
be asked in the name of dialogue and with a great deal of admiration
9. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10. See text accompanying notes 93 to 108 infra.
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for the skill and learning illustrated by all three speakers. Particular
appreciation should be expressed to Justice Rehnquist for the can-
dor and sophistication with which, as a sitting Justice, he articu-
lated his juridical beliefs and opened himself to public view.
II. JUDICIAL HUMILITY AND THE SCORNFUL TONE-A COMMON
GROUND
All the participants began their presentations by voicing dis-
comfort over the ambiguity and breadth of the symposium's title."
Attempting to find a common link among the three, therefore, re-
quires doing each an injustice by failing to emphasize important
contributions made by the individual speakers, by generalizing spe-
cific arguments into a common level of discourse on points which
were not addressed by all and by seeking shared social and political
assumptions. Justice Rehnquist, however, sets a tone for the sym-
posium discernible in all three lead articles: "[S]omething can be
gained by looking at the subject in a purely jurisprudential way.
. .. I will try to take the measure of our adversaiy system as a
useful tool in the maintenance of a good society or the building of a
better society."'"
Given the topic of the symposium, this passage suggests: first,
that the judiciary functions as a branch of government primarily to
resolve personal disputes, disputes between private parties or a per-
son and government; and second, that the instrumental value of this
method of disposing of social disputes as a problem for government
should be the measure of both what kinds of disruptions of order are
appropriately cast as adversarial, and how well judges do their jobs.
Surely, these are rather standard assumptions.' 3 Yet, while the so-
cietal need for some dispute resolution machinery defines a role for
the judiciary, in that judges only act at the request of specific dis-
puting parties (a formal requirement reflected in jurisdiction or jus-
ticiability doctrine"), the judicial function potentially comprehends
11. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 21; Rehnquist, The Adversary Society: Keynote Address of the Third Annual Baron de
Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MLIAM L. Rav. 1; Address by Professor Laurence
Tribe, Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series 40 (February 2, 1978) (transcript
on file at the University of Miami Law Review).
12. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 2.
13. See generally E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-8, 102-04 (1970); K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11-24 (1973); Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sci-
ences-especially Sociology, 62 HALv. L. REv. 1286, 1291-92; H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1-9, 112-29 (Tent. ed., 1958)
(Harvard Law School).
14. By these formal requirements, I refer to the procedural requirements a litigant must
meet in order to have his case heard in federal court, for example, the "case or controversy"
requirement imposed by article I of the Constitution. I mean to take no stand on the actual
[Vol. 33:59
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more than the resolution of a particular dispute. 5 Two questions
immediately arise. First, to what extent did each speaker under-
stand his argument, as did Justice Rehnquist, as an instrumental
evaluation"5 of the adversary process? Second, to what extent does
this potential parallelism of critical attitude towards the actions of
judges imply a preoccupation with judicial activism in all jurispru-
dential analysis of the judicial institution? Answers to these ques-
tions require a considerable reconstruction of the lead articles, but
once their ideas can be juxtaposed at the same level of discourse,
the speakers evince a richly disparate and sophisticated contro-
versy.
A. Judging the Value of What Judges Do
Justice Rehnquist explicitly evaluated the adversary process in
instrumental terms. He would weigh the costs and benefits of re-
course to an adversary process in each case as a sufficient considera-
tion to restrict the use of litigation in contexts which otherwise meet
all the formal prerequisites of the adversary process. 7 What then
defines the elements or variables of this cost-benefit calculus?
First, although he noted a distinction between disputes about
social problems "the dimensions of which exceed the importance of
the resolution of the particular controversy to those immediately
embroiled in it,"'" and purely two-party litigation, 9 Justice Rehn-
quist saw no reason categorically to exclude social problems from
courts. 0 Rather, his concern lay with the costs of using the judicial
requirements or the extent to which such procedural prerequisites can be, or should be,
manipulated.
15. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459-543 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the relationship of social mores and legislation as reflected in constitu-
tional litigation).
16. I use the term "instrumental" to mean purpose or goal-oriented or, as Professor Tribe
expressed it, "that form of rationality [in this case, evaluation] which seeks to discriminate
among alternative actions by assessing their comparative tendency to advance or to retard
the achievement of the actor's goals or values." Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth
Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. RPv. 617, 618 (1973)
(emphasis omitted).
17. "I am suggesting that the 'adversary system' with its use of litigation is not capable
of being valued in gross, and that its uncritical expansion is demanded neither by Bracton's
maxim nor by the general principles we associate with a government of law." Rehnquist,
supra note 11, at 3.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Of course, even two-party disputes, given the force of precedent, decide issues for the
classes of individuals of which the parties are representatives and to that extent always
concern "social problems." See Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, in PROCE DINGS OF
THE AMERICAN Socliry oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-8 (1960).
20. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 15, 18. But see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 passim (1976) [hereinafter cited as Living Constitution.].
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institution at all, regardless of the particular legal question. "The
adversary system is best viewed as an expansive continuum."2 But
the continuum does not stretch from easy to hard cases, or from
purely private disputes to those of social interest. The continuum
relates to a ranking of cases by the importance of ending the legal
controversies as discounted by the costs of crystalizing the disputes
in any formal way: "[M]y hypothesis is not that an individual's
claim for redress of wrong would be better vindicated in a non-
adversarial system, but that in some situations it is best not vindi-
cated at all." 2 The cost of adversarial litigation often includes
irreversible damage to private institutions caused by a member
fighting against the institution's authority or by members fighting
amongst themselves.23 Adjudication and solution of the dispute may
be worth the cost, but "we ought to judge each situation carefully
to make sure that the game is always worth the candle." 2'
Second, Justice Rehnquist argued by example that all branches
of government can appropriately decide within their competence
that some disputes are not worth servicing in an adversary context,
regardless of whether the claim seeks a constitutionally,2 legisla-
tively,26 or judicially" defined remedy.
Third, selective limitations on access to adversary proceedings
can be justified independently of whether the same individuals
would have enforceable rights and correlative duties in a different
institutional context,21 "the very concept of government means the
rejection, albeit by a democratic process, of certain claims to indi-
vidual liberty." 2'
In sum, the structure of modern society depends upon creating
a government which is designed to protect traditional institutions
as a prior context for liberty, rather than to guarantee individual
choice as the condition of liberty in the building and changing of
private or public institutions." Servicing a hypothetically provable
claim of individual right inherently involves an instrumental social
choice. At least in a society whose government rests not simply on
21. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 3.
22. Id. at 10.
23. See id., at 4.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 5 (discussing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976)).
26. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)).
27. Id. at 10-12 (discussing Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d
169 (1977)).
28. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 7.




an aggregation of atomistic individual preferences,3' demands for
governmental services like dispute resolution must be measured by
the contribution of those services to the social good. Such a measure
includes the negative costs to social welfare caused by weakening
the ordering function performed by private institutions in a pluralis-
tic society. Government, including the judiciary, functions for Jus-
tice Rehnquist as a semi-autonomous center of authority to recon-
cile order and liberty. Quoting from E.H. Carr, Justice Rehnquist
argued: "'In short, government is a process by which some people
exercise compulsion on others. This is as true of democracy as of
other forms of government; the criteria are by whom, by what
means, and for what, the compulsion is exercised.' "I' Whatever
balance of interests legitimates other governmental distributional
decisions, such as the provision of welfare benefits, also legitimates
the provision or withholding of the governmental service of access
to the judiciary. By logical extension, Justice Rehnquist must argue
that courts should take account of their own power to compel others
as a branch of government and must, therefore, enjoin judges to self-
consciously balance the potential social impact of their decisions as
part of their methodology.
Professor Tribe supports a strong role for adversary resolution
of rights disputes at least in part on an instrumental, critical stance;
"[t]he real question is whether the virtues and vices . . . of [a
pluralistic] democracy are consistent with assigning a large and
active role to the adversary process."" He identified seven falla-
cies in arguments for restraint of judicial decisionmaking in order
to prevent overemphasizing the relative costs of judicial decision-
making and undervaluing the need for access to the judicial insti-
tution. 4 Professor Tribe concluded that access to the judicial
institution ranks as fundamental, seemingly not because of an as-
sumption about the necessity of judicial resolution of disputes but
rather because of its critical value as a matter of policy.3 However,
Professor Tribe saw the judiciary more as a function, integral to the
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 7 (quoting from E. CARR, THE Sovirr ImpACT ON THE WESTERN WORLD 10-11
(1947)).
33. Tribe, supra note 8, at 43.
34. See id. at 46-57.
35. See, e.g., id. at 56-57. Professor Tribe's conclusion is consistent with that of Judge
Friendly. See note 226 infra. Professor Tribe implied that he agrees with Justice Rehnquist
on the incorrectness of the wrongful life case set forth in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __
Minn. _ 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977). However, Professor Tribe questioned whether "recogni-
tion of the cause of action by the Minnesota Legislature [would] have been any sounder."
Tribe, supra note 8, at 56 n.59.
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notion of government, than as a service which can be withheld upon
mere rationality.
In fact, the legitimacy of our system of government requires rela-
tively unimpeded access to litigation to do two distinct things:
first, to articulate the underlying framework of rights within
which pluralistic bargaining is to occur; and second, to provide
an avenue of participation for those individuals and groups that
have not yet been effectively absorbed into the mainstream coali-
tions of pluralist politics."
One must separate the view, therefore, that government should in-
strumentally assign a role in governance to litigation from the view
which restricts the judicial method in the use of policy to carry out
that role based on the fear of unjustified activism.37 Professor Tribe
contributed to potential confusion by drawing a sharp if ambiguous
conceptual break between his description of the judicial institutions
and their operation, on the one hand, and his critique of the seven
fallacies, which assumes the terms of the traditional activism de-
bate, on the other.
Perhaps Judge Friendly evinced the least instrumental analysis
of the judicial function in the symposium. Contrary to Justice
Rehnquist's assumption that the rule of law notion (a society's dis-
tribution via enforceable rules of burdens and benefits, rights and
duties) can be separated from the adversarial enforcement of rights
(a governmental service which can be distributed by instrumental
policy choices),38 Judge Friendly assumed that access to the judici-
ary for the resolution of disputes about law rests on a fundamental
premise of democracy. Legislative decisions both aim at and presup-
pose the enforcement of individual liberty39 in a format which can-
not be parsed instrumentally. The legitimacy attached to democ-
racy, and thus the preference for legislated policy implied by Judge
Friendly, depends upon a belief that the governmental process even-
handedly protects the input of individuals to the political process
through, for example, voting, lobbying and public speaking. This
belief in turn depends on the actuality of prior equal protection of
36. Tribe, supra note 8, at 45-46. See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
37. "But we fool ourselves if we forget that any judicial decision either alters the status
quo or ratifies it. We'd be far better served by candid recognition that these are the stakes
not whether courts should act, but what they should decide." Tribe, The Myth of the Imperial
Judiciary, Wash. Post, March 29, 1978, § A, at 23.
38. This characterization of Justice Rehnquist's implicit assumption follows from the
reconstruction of his discussion supplied above. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
39. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 21.
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rights to the product of legislative choices, past benefit distribu-
tions. 0 In fact, the resolution of claims of right is sufficiently funda-
mental that while legislative institutions should be preferred as pol-
icymakers, if jurisdictionally appropriate litigation requires, "courts
must address themselves in some instances to issues of social policy,
not because this is particularly desirable, but because often there
is no feasible alternative."" Since courts must use policy at times,
criticism should be deflected from the fact of use to the occasion and
manner in which judges use policy. In speaking of the instrumental
value of courts, then, the teleology must be that of conformance to
democratic protection of individual liberty.'2 Judge Friendly's
stance, because it rests on conventional democratic assumptions,4
becomes more critical, therefore, when answering the second ques-
tion concerning the speakers' attitudes toward judicial power: Will
the difference in assumptions about the relation of the individual
to social organization lead Judge Friendly to a greater or lesser
commitment to the terms of the traditional activism debate which
began with the norm that social policy should be made by elected
representatives?
B. Judging the Values Which Judges Should Usg
The second question posed for all three speakers is the extent
to which the instrumental perspective of each logically leads to a
position on judicial activism. Professor Tribe explicitly acknowl-
edged that "we must ultimately come to terms with the general
question of whether we should assume a welcoming or a hostile
attitude toward . . . judicial activism."" Clearly, Judge Friendly,
viewed the question as "natural"' 5 in that he asked whether courts
should decide issues of social policy," and noted both the extent to
which policy has been used in defining private law rights,'7 and the
difference in critical reaction when relying on policy in public law
40. See also Tribe, supra note 8, at 48.
41. Friendly, supra note 11, at 21.
42. In this sense, Judge Friendly appears to follow the tradition begun by Hobbes, Locke
and Paine. The significant differences between the political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke
and Paine are not crucial to this point. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 19-20 n.47.
43. "Mr. Justice Rehnquist has approached the subject from a novel and thoughtful
angle; I shall approach it from a more conventional one." Friendly, supra note 11, at 21.
44. Tribe, supra note 8, at 43.
45. Friendly, supra note 11, at 27. Judge Friendly considered natural the criticism of
courts that use social policy to invalidate action taken by other branches of government. He
did, however, qualify his view as to those constitutional rights which must be substantively
defined by the judiciary. Id. at 27-28.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 24-26.
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adjudication.48 "If policymaking authority has been vested in an-
other body, by what warrant does a court substitute its own contrary
views?"'" Only Justice Rehnquist insisted his analysis does not de-
pend upon taking a position respecting judicial activism A0 Yet, his
assumptions belie this possibility in a curious way: his belief in
traditional "institutions," whether public or private, argues for ju-
dicial "deferral"; 5 but his instrumental view of the costs of litiga-
tion assumes, if not demands, an active and independent judicial
setting of protective policies toward those institutions. 2 The Jus-
tice's intricate reasoning leads to an inexorably activist end point,
perhaps not as a matter of separation of powers, but as a matter of
the fulfillment of the judiciary's role in interpreting legal language.
In order to avoid misstatement, consider his own words:53
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id.
50. We all know there has been a great deal spoken and written about the
use of courts and of the law as a vehicle for social reform . . . .Because so much
has been spoken and written on this particular aspect of the subject of today's
forum, I have chosen to go at the matter from another angle.
Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 2.
51. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at passim; Witsotsky, Beyond Legitimacy, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 175, 176 (1978); text accompanying note 30 supra.
52. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, -
'Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977)). Justice Rehnquist was troubled by the court's apparent
failure to consider that allowing an adversary proceeding for "wrongful birth" could severely
damage the institutional value of the family. He concluded that the court "arguably should
have refused to have an adversary hearihg on the merits of [the] claim because of some over-
riding public policy which outweighed the virtues of an adversary hearing." Id. at 13. See
also text accompanying notes 17-32 supra; Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 12-13 (discussing the
legislative abolishment of "heart balm" actions because of their associated abuses and dam-
age to social values, and the propriety of a hypothetical parent-child adversary hearing to
determine whether children should be forced to undergo surgery against their wishes).
53. The nine quotations following this note in text, all from Justice Rehnquist's article,
can be reduced to demonstrate the formal logical progression to the activist conclusion. The
order corresponds to that of the statements given in the text:
(1) Litigation is a mechanism which defines social relationships as rights.
(2) A mechanism which defines rights may be a threat to institutional relation-
ships.
(3) Therefore, litigation may be a threat to institutional relationships.
(4) Claims of individual rights, when they threaten the species must yield to the
claims of the species.
(5) Therefore, when a mechanism defining rights threatens the species, it should
yield to the claims of the species.
(6) Claims of the species are appropriately considered by judges in determining
whether to decide an adversary proceeding.
(7) Thus, when claims of individual right are asserted, the appropriate exercise
of the judicial function requires recognition of institutional priority and interde-
pendence.
(8) The maintenance of social cohesion is the object of government.
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(1) "[L]itigation to solve social problems, or even disputes of
far less moment, necessarily assumes correlative rights and duties
as between one individual and another and as between the indi-
vidual and the government."5
(2) "[Tihe very crystallization of the parties' differences [over
rights and duties] in the adversary process may threaten the
future of the institutional relationship.""
(3) "[Alt a minimum, I think we must be aware of the societal
interests being sacrificed in pursuit of providing an adversary
forum for the vindication of what we perceive to be meritorious
claims of individual right." 6
(4) "There are times when the claims of the individual should
be subordinated to those of the 'species,' even if the species is not
government itself but a private institution which serves a useful
purpose." 7
(5) [This is a matter of substantive law."8 ] "The refusal of the
courts to review these claims [individual liberty versus private
institutions] as they would claims of individual rights made by
members of other voluntary associations means that the law in
these particular cases is attaching special weight to the institu-
tional decision.
' '59
(6) "Each of the examples I have mentioned involved situations
in which courts either have, or arguably should have, refused to
have an adversary hearing on the merits of a claim because of
some overriding public policy which outweighed the virtues of an
adversary hearing.""0
(7) [Judges, within their ability to interpret claims for relief
(questions of law)] "serve us poorly if they do not recognize that
the world in which we live is an intricate web of relationships
between people, private institutions and government at its var-
ious levels."'"
(8) [Liet me freely admit there is an element of authoritar-
ianism in the views that I have advanced this morning . *..,12
bust as there is an element of authoritarianism in the very con-
cept of government itself.]
(9) Therefore, the appropriate judiciary is government acting to preserve social
cohesion. Social cohesion, according to Burke, is dependent on natural law. Thus,
the judiciary must resort to natural law to maintain social cohesion.
54. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 3.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 18.
58. See id. at 3.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 17.
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(9) [Judges recognize and legitimize the proper balance of so-
cial interest and individual claim by resort to a form of natural
law, since, as quoted by Justice Rehnquist from Edmund
Burke], " 'Each contract of each particular state is but a clause
in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the
lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible
world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by inviolable oath
which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their
appointed place.' "63
Justice Rehnquist, in fact, believed that he could do no better than
to ascribe to Burke's view. 4 He thus both evaluated judicial per-
formance and instructed judges to act by reference to a calculus of
social and individual interest in litigation in deciding any particular
dispute. Judges must set policy in the name of social good.
But, it might be replied, the degree of activism involved may
be low if the direct substantive balancing done by courts takes place
only in purely judicial spheres of authority, such as equity, remedy
or common law. Indeed, previously, the Justice has strongly disap-
proved of interpretation of law "based upon the proposition that
federal judges, perhaps judges as a whole, have a role of their own,
quite independent of popular will, to play in solving society's prob-
lems.""5 This aversion, however, rested on a particular positivistic
view of social organization:
[Tihe laws that emerge after a typical political struggle in
which various individual value judgments are debated likewise
take on a form of moral goodness because they have been enacted
into positive law. . . [Safeguards for individual liberty] assume
a general social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth
nor because of any unique origins in someone's [Burke's?] idea
of natural justice but instead simply because they have been
incorporated in a constitution by the people."
Significantly, Justice Rehnquist abandoned this traditional anchor
for judicial deferral in this symposium, thus removing the logical
brake on judicial use of the policy favoring private institutions as
long as the judge acts in service of the correct Burkian natural
principle."
Justice Rehnquist repudiated his prior, positivist view in four
instances. First, he separated the notions of just claims and access
63. Id. at 19 (quoting E. BuRKE, RELECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 93-94 (E.
Rhys 1910)).
64. See id.
65. Living Constitution, supra note 20, at 698.
66. Id. at 704.
67. See note 53 and text accompanying notes 54-63 supra.
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to litigation and, in fact, allowed judicial balancing of the two con-
cepts. 8 Second, by embracing Burke at the end of his discussion,
he rejected the political theory of The Notion of a Living
Constitution by rejecting Locke and Paine. 9 Third, he rejected the
notion of society as an aggregate of atomistic individuals in favor of
a principle of interdependence; for Justice Rehnquist, society con-
sists of a fabric of institutions necessary to secure liberty but prior
to liberty which it is the object of all governmental institutions to
secure in the common interest." Fourth, and most telling of all, in
an exchange during the question and answer period at the Third
Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lectures, Justice Rehnquist admit-
ted that room existed within judicial interpretative functions to
apply the judge's understanding of the good or liberty: "As you say
it boils down to a question of degree. And just how much do you read
in the clauses, they are by no means clear, that may turn out in
retrospect to be your own ideas rather than perhaps more objec-
tively based ones?"'"
68. Justice Rehnquist concluded that potential harm to institutional values must be
weighed against individual claims of right, and where such harm outweighs the asserted right,
the claim may be barred by the judiciary. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
69. Justice Rehnquist wrote of Burke:
He abhorred the idea, espoused in turn by Hobbes, Locke and Paine, that the
relationship between individual citizens and their government was essentially
that of master and servant to be governed by the law of agency. While he approved
of many institutions and ideas which are totally anachronistic in our time, he did
demolish, for me at least, the idea that society is based on nothing more than an
implied contract between the citizens and their current government. Society for
him included not only citizen and government, but institutions as well; it was
bequeathed by our forefathers to us in trust for generations yet unborn.
Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 18 (footnote omitted).
In contrast to this natural law view, Justice Rehnquist earlier had expressed a positivistic
view of the source of values:
The laws that emerge after a typical political struggle in which various individual
value judgments are debated likewise take on a form of moral goodness because
they have been enacted into positive law. It is the fact of their enactment that
gives them whatever moral claim they have upon us as a society, however, and
not any independent virtue they may have in any particular citizen's own scale
of values.
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no basis
other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as a platform
for the launching of moral judgments.
Living Constitution, supra note 20, at 704.
70. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 17.
71. The entire exchange was as follows:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST:
I think the place where probably you and I disagree most [is on]. .. [ylour
elitist fallacy, and I think this probably stems from something that is incapa-
ble of inter-subjective demonstration. It has always seemed to me that if you've
got a party of ten going somewhere and you come to a fork in the trail and the
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In his mixture of Burkian conservatism and organic communi-
tarianism,2 Justice Rehnquist does truly differ from Professor Tribe
only in degree, but the tone of the traditional tug of war between
individualistic democracy and judically enforced rights shifts dra-
matically. The denial of a Thomistic vision 3 which usurps legisla-
tive social policy found in his exchange with Professor Tribe, and
the positivism of The Notion of a Living Constitution appear en-
tirely inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Carr and
Burke. 4 Traditional institutions shape a context for liberty which,
for Justice Rehnquist, decides the content of those limitations of
right which restrict the operation of legislative choice.
True, Justice Rehnquist's activism relates less to the separation
of powers notion of correct interaction of judges and legislatures,
than to choice of alternative interpretations of disputed legal lan-
guage. Yet, although Justice Rehnquist finds the source of his vision
of the just society in historically important traditional institutions,75
party has agreed to stay together, yet six want to take the right fork and four want
to take the left fork, you go the way the majority wants to go. And that, to me,
any right that is going to be recognized in a society that pretends to be democratic
has to have some sort of imprimatur like that on it. I simply cannot concede that
there are a sort of thomistic world of rights that judges, although they may have
far higher IQ's and better understandings of jurisprudence and legislation perhaps
than lawmakers, are free to . . . override the legislature.
PROFESSOR TRIBE:
I think that our difference may be more one of degree than anything else, as
I am also skeptical of the capacity of philosopher kings to offer answers that will
endure forever. But I see the problem of the ten travelers a little differently. It is
as though the ten had decided in the beginning that there are certain matters,
perhaps the right of any one of the travelers not to be sacrificed by a majority
vote of the others, that they would entrust to neutral arbiters, if not philosopher
kings. If the six travelers should then say that, all things considered, it would be
better if a seventh were to be sacrificed, or if one were to be silenced, shouldn't
those who had been delegated the task of defending basic principles intervene
even though it would mean overriding the majority?
JUSTICE REHNQUIST:
Well, no one, certainly least of all I, doubt that if the Constitution says in so
many words that Congress shall not have the power to do this, the courts ought
to firmly back it up. As you say, it boils down to a question of degree. And just
how much you read into the clauses, that are by no means clear, what may turn
out in retrospect to be your own ideas rather than perhaps more objectively based
ones?
Panel Discussion, Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series at 8-9 (Feb. 2, 1978)
(question and answer transcript on file at the University of Miami Law Review).
72. Professor Tribe described organic communitarianism as the antithesis of liberal
individualism. Tribe, supra note 8, at 1.
73. Justice Rehnquist denied any reliance on a theory of natural law in his discussion
with Professor Tribe because of the inability of any individual to claim his or her version of
natural law is the only correct one.
74. Rehnquist supra note 11, at 7, 19.
75. Id. at 18-19.
[Vol. 33:59
THE JUDGING GLASS
while Professor Tribe locates the source of his fundamental values
in the requirements of a workable social rationality," both recog-
nized the interpretative function will be ruled by subjectively
recognized values lexically prior to politics" and one's perception of
institutional capacity."
Thus, separation of powers depends on the inherent character-
istics of both the judiciary and the legislature, regardless of the
desideratum that social policy must be set by democratic institu-
tions. As Professor Tribe stated: "Unless we are prepared to argue
that the fourteenth amendment protects no substantive liberty at
all . . . we are committed to the position that part of the Supreme
Court's proper role is defining the substantive content of human
freedom."7 Justice Rehnquist cannot reject the preceding state-
ment after consciously embracing the jurisprudence he so coher-
ently outlined, and grounded, in this symposium.2
Professor Tribe recognized the claims for legitimacy of legisla-
tively assigned burdens and benefits within an interdependent plu-
ralism, but argued, as did Justice Rehnquist, that the distribution
of legislated rights and duties based on a policy of increased social
welfare does not exhaust the purpose or product of government .8 He
76. Tribe, supra note 8, at 45.
77. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 18-19 (values endure over the ages); Tribe, supra
note 8, at 45 (the legitimacy of values rests not in popular support, but in the "persuasiveness
of the reasons that can be adduced for them").
78. See Rehnquist supra note 11, at 2-3 (potential of adversary procedure to damage
institutional value); Tribe supra note 8, at 52-53, 54-57 (the fallacies of "undue modesty" and
"institutionalism").
79. Tribe, supra note 8, at 55. Justice Rehnquist took a similar position in his dissent-
ing opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1937): "I agree [that] . . . the 'liberty' against
deprivation of which the Fourteenth Amendment protects embraces more than the rights
found in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 173. Justice Rehnquist proceeded to discuss the constitu-
tional test used in due process challenges: "But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely
against deprivation, but only against deprivation without due process of law. The test tradi-
tionally applied . . . is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation
to a valid state objective." Id. at 173. While the Justice's qualification seems to undermine
his expansive statement about liberty, the effect is illusory. As Professor Tribe pointed out,
"judicial authority to reject the legislature's accommodation of conflicting values is no less
substantive because its exercise is justified by 'extreme' cases, or because it is invoked in the
name of rationality." Tribe, supra note 8, at 55. In both cases a court is acting to override
majority will. Thus, once the judge draws any line, the intrusion on legislative interests, and
the judicial definition of the contents of rights, must be acknowledged as equally substantive
regardless of where the line is drawn.
80. "I hope it will become evident that while my position on this issue cannot
easily be labeled 'conservative' or 'liberal' according to any modern day under-
standing of those terms, I do find myself in very good philosophical company when
I express some skepticism about the desirability of adversary proceedings in a
number of situations.
Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 3.
81. See Tribe, supra note 8, at 44.
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argued: first, a political role for the judiciary exists to create access
to the governmental process for groups of perennial political outsi-
ders and to address basic questions of social value which underlie
the bargaining over burdens and benefits of pluralistic interest
groups.82 In this sense, litigants, especially groups powerless in the
legislative process, go to court not simply to settle an academic
interest in the meaning of a legal rule but to gain their share of the
distributed benefits which result from a judicial clarification of a
disputed legal rule. "[Aidjudication is not a threat to the integrity
of our form of government. In fact, . . . [it] is indispensable to its
legitimacy." 3 Second, to admit any substantive role for the judici-
ary, particularly a duty to preserve traditional institutions over in-
dividual rights, makes all decisions a matter of substantive policy
as either ratifications or rejections of legislative policy.8' Rather,
"[alt stake is a dialogue between the various components of the
political system, not a selection among political alternatives. The
question is whether we should be distressed when courts are given
a large voice in that dialogue." 85 While we may be distressed with
particular judicial or legislative decisions, the question of activism
evaporates. Activism is simply government, the judiciary doing its
job whether or not in passive voice.
Thus, on either Professor Tribe's or Justice Rehnquist's as-
sumptions, if not their statements, constitutional democracy cannot
be normatively defined or restricted justifiably by an external
critic's instrumental evaluation. Only the government institutions
themselves, in dialogue and internally in their decisions, can make
such instrumental choices. The legitimate concern that government
will overreach its rationale of limiting individual conduct in the
name of public interest can only coherently surface as a demand for
justification of each branch of government's pronouncements in the
governmental dialogue." Legislatures ground in elections, judiciar-
ies in their argument, "the legitimacy of any starting point of basic
values or basic rights must rest in the persuasiveness of the reasons
82. Id.
83. Id. at 46.
84. See id. at 55; note 79 supra. See also L. TIME, AmEmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-13,
47-52 (1977); Wisotsky, supra note 51, at 187-88.
85. Tribe, supra note 8, at 54.
86. [T~he difficulty with such conventional wisdom about the political lim-
its of constitutional law is that it undervalues the place of constitutional discourse
and decision in political dialogue. By debating our deepest differences in the
shared language of constitutional rights and responsibilities, we create the possi-
bility of persuasion and even moral education in our national life.
L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 13 (footnote omitted).
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that can be adduced for them."87 Professor Tribe might as well have
been quoting Justice Rehnquist as Hegel in concluding, "'[a] con-
stitution is not just something manufactured, it is the work of centu-
ries, . . . the consciousness of rationality so far as that conscious-
ness is developed in a particular nation. No constitution, .. is just
the creation of its subjects.' "88
But what of the nearly forgotten Judge Friendly? Despite his
statement of the "activism" issue in traditional terms, Judge
Friendly fundamentally understands the defining characteristic of
the judicial function to be not litigation per se, but a decision which
survives only if legitimated."9 These justifications, regardless of
whether the rationale rests on policy, principle or natural right,
and embodied in written linguistics, take a particular form: "[U]n-
like legislatures, which may properly frame pragmatic rules having
no relation to strict logic, courts should render a principled decision
that will apply to a great sweep of cases."" A semantic surface
confusion wrought by the historical statement of the false activism
debate favors decision by jural principle rather than desirable no-
tions of policy, But Judge Friendly himself noted "acut[e]
conscious[ness] of the question-begging character" of such princi-
ples.' Judge Friendly questioned the use of policy unalloyed with
87. Tribe, supra note 8, at 45.
88. Id. (quoting G. HEGEL, PiLOsopHy o RIoHT 286-87 (T.M. Krox trans. 1967) (em-
phasis added)); see Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 12 (quoting E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 93-94 (E. Rhys 1910)). In his criticism of Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, - Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977), Justice Rehnquist observed: "But equally
troubling is the fact that this decision was apparently made without careful acknowledgement
and weighing of the values being undercut by the introduction of adversary proceedings into
the family setting." Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 12. Thus, both Justice Rehnquist and
Professor Tribe recognized the significance of long-standing social values.
89. "A constitutional decision derived from the Justices' notions of good social policy
will fare badly, . . . unless the public policy considerations are clearly stated and the decision
embodied in some rational statement of principle." Friendly, supra note 11, at 42.
90. Id. at 3. For a discussion of "neutral principles," see Wisotsky, supra note 51 at 183,
185-88.
91. Friendly, supra note 11, at 21 n.2.
Thus, whether Judge Friendly, on the jurisprudential level argued by Justice Rehnquist
and Professor Tribe, could be characterized as noninstrumental, or whether he encourages or
discourages a broad use of the judge's political powers of choice, he nonetheless recognized
that constitutional adjudication is inherently active in a way to which the concept of degree
cannot be applied.
There seems to be a kind of spontaneous generation about the federal constitu-
tion; the more questions about it are answered, the more there are to be answered.
Although this was hardly their prime purpose, the framers of our constitutions
did stake out a preserve where American judges need not accept the subordination
to the legislature that is the lot of their counterparts in England, perhaps here
lie the seeds of a Freudian explanation of judicial activism in constitutional law.
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 787, 788 (1963) (footnote omitted).
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principle as the justifying rationale, not the inherent necessity of
policymaking in the framing of jural principles for which logical
rationales can be offered. But the forming of principle depends upon
more than manipulation of static rules. Rather than engaging in
sophisticated fencing about the terms of an irrelevant debate, Judge
Friendly puzzled about how claims of right versus public and/or
private institutions (no matter how democratic) can be transformed
from their dynamic, existential context into a static written form
which permits the judges to articulate and justify basic values or
rules of conduct evolved through an ongoing process. "Ultimately,
however, one must face the question of how a case of such over-
whelming social import could be translated into a principle of con-
stitutional law . " Only Judge Friendly, therefore, leads the
way through the judging glass to focus on the importance of the
articulation of the claim as an integral part of justifying the inherent
substantive policy involved in the judicial component of constitu-
tional government.
III. ALICE'S QUESTION AND Barnette-SOME OLD ANSWERS
Taken to its logical conclusion by these participants, the activ-
ism debate becomes circular and thus intractable. Perhaps the con-
tinuing fascination with judicial activism in the forty years since the
supposed decline of the formalistic method and economic due pro-
cess and the rise of pluralistic positivism, 3 relates to the Holy Grail
92. Friendly, supra note 11, at 33 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Judge
Friendly believed that this problem of judicial translation arises in the interpretation of
legislative enactments and common law and principles as well as in constitutional interpreta-
tion.
93. The substantive interpretation of the due process clause changed radically in the
period following the economic depression of 1929 from broad judicial protection of an individ-
ual's freedom to contract to benign examination of regulatory policies established by New
Deal legislation. The epitome of pre-depression era substantive due process philosophy was
articulated in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner the Court invalidated a
New York statute which provided that bakery employees work no more than 60 hours per
week or 10 hours per day on the basis of the individual's right to contract. The protection of
common law or natural law rights at the federal level was implemented through the vehicle
of the fourteenth amendment: "The general right to make a contract in relation to his
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution . . . . The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this amendment .... " Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
The Court recognized the power of the state to prevent the individual from entering
certain kinds of contracts involving the "safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
public." Id. at 53. But in cases where the state exercised its police power in a way which
limited the private individual's common law right to contract or right to labor, the Court
severely restricted the state's ability to exercise that power. Id. at 54-56. The Lochner tech-
nique proceeded by culling the substantive content of the due process clause from a natural
law tradition which had been built upon particular philosophical and economic assumptions.
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quality of each attempt to solve the debate. How then did the de-
bate go wrong? Why did the debate cease to progress beyond in-
creasingly formalized, albeit sophisticated and philosophically
grounded, restatements?
The answer hides in the statement of the debate, namely "when
can judges be politically active?" The assumption that judges have
a choice not to be active ultimately depends upon an epistemology
The Lochner Court could rely on precedent for this technique. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798) discussed in L. TIUNE, supra note 84, at 450. The Court thus used the
fourteenth amendment as a vehicle to overcome political majorities, "[otherwise the Four-
teenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have
unbounded power .. " 198 U.S. at 56.
During the 1920's, the internal structure of the Lochner doctrine began to erode and
commentators called for the abandonment of the doctrine. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
[R]ather than invalidating statutes in which the public character of the benefit
was unclear while the private harm was both evident and focused, the Court in
effect forced the public to internalize private costs in ambiguous cases by requir-
ing government to compensate private parties for what they were being forced to
lose. This approach obviously infringes on Lochner-recognized private property
and contract rights and blurs the distinction between private and public purposes
which lies at the heart of the Lochner philosophy.
L. TRBE, supra note 84, at 445 (footnote omitted).
This distinction was further blurred six years later in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928). In Miller, pursuant to a Virginia statutory scheme to control tree disease, red cedar
trees infected with a disease were ordered to be destroyed so that the commercial value of
nearby apple orchards would be preserved. Based on the importance of the apple orchards to
the state's economy, the Court upheld the statute without requiring compensation for the
cedar owners. Id. at 279. Under the Lochner doctrine, however, the statute infringed on the
property rights of cedar owners in favor of apple orchard owners. Justice Stone's opinion for
the Court recognized the public and private interests as virtually identical:
When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers
by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public ...
[Flor it is obvious that there may be and here there is, a preponderant public
concern in the preservation of one interest over the other.
Id. at 279. The common law roots of the police power boundaries, the line between the public
and private spheres, was eroded in these eminent domain cases. The Court could no longer
prevent states from redressing economic inequalities in the name of economic growth.
In 1937, the Court broadsided the Lochner philosophy in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), when it upheld a Washington minimum wage law for women. Chief
Justice Hughes, for the Court, argued that "liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organiza-
tion which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people." Id. at 391. The Supreme Court's recognition that a state
may legitimately defend an economically exploited class of persons from conditions that
would otherwise deprive the class members of benefits and that a state may defend such an
exploited class by restricting the selfishness of the economically dominant producers, must
be seen as symptomatic of a general retreat from a judicial attempt to define the limits of
the political process of government. Because the Court used the technique of deferral in
abandoning Lochner, the Court's limited scrutiny gave way to virtual judicial abdication. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally Tribe, supra note 8, at 56-
57 (fallacy of institutionalism).
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perhaps available to the Framers of the Constitution94 but implausi-
ble today. The inherently subjective political leeway in the interpre-
tative formulation and application of rules to a dispute, which re-
sults in a reasoned extension of past decisions to a new, more parti-
cularized statement of principle, makes even the most narrow and
precise legal language open-ended in content.95 At most, constitu-
tional definitions and legislated statutes communicate a rough pur-
pose dr model. 6 Regardless of the underlying tension between those
who emphasize the values in broad rights of the individual as op-
posed to those who emphasize the democracy of majority rule, an
airtight division between what judges do and what legislators choose
can no longer be maintained. 7 Once it is recognized that the activ-
ism issue cannot believably be a dichotomy between purely deduc-
tive, objective judgment versus political policy manipulation,98 the
question becomes perceived as simply a matter of degree in the
judicial choice of policy.
At this second stage of argument, those who debate judicial
activism then polarize the question of degree through their under-
standing of the relative institutional adequacy, accountability or
legitimacy of the legislature and judiciary to, make policy. But they
choose their institutional positions via the same value assumptions
of "democratic legitimacy" or "neutral protection of fundamental
principles" behind the first stage of the debate. Opposed institu-
tional norms, such as decision by jural principle versus decision by
intended legislative policy, relabel but do not change the ultimate
resort to a difference in social values which gain legitimacy as part
of a system of political organization.'00 When jural principles be-
come as open-ended in the practice of judging as the legal rule they
interpretively define, the dichotomy reaches the Tribe-Rehnquist
stage. Under the surface of their argument of "degree,"'' the debat-
94. The judiciary "may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judge-
ment." Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST 504 (E. Earle ed. 1937).
95. "[In most cases when courts say that a statute is plain and therefore needs no
interpretation, they do so in the inverted fashion which marks so much of the judicial process.
They have already interpreted, and they then declare that so interpreted the statute needs
no further interpretation." Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAiv. L. REV. 863, 869 (1930).
96. Living Constitution, supra, note 20, at 704. See also, Freund, Individual and Com-
monwealth in the Thought of Mr. Justice Jackson, 8 STA. L. REV. 9 (1955). "The judge's
emancipation, so far as it is proper, reflects the fact that the crucial terms of the Constitution
are open-ended, as, for example, due process and equal protection of the laws, or ambiguous,
like the first amendment guarantees .. " Id. at 9.
97. See Wisotsky, supra note 51, at 197-98.
98. Id.
99. See, id. at 179-80, 184:85.
100. See id. at 197.
101. See note 71 supra.
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ers misperceive their institutional differences. Their dispute is de-
fined by a categorically different set of social values. These values
distinguish social situations which justify judicial policymaking in
the form of interpretation of open-ended legal language and social
situations which demand policymaking in the form of ratifications
of legislative policy under the rubric of "deferral."'' 2 Both stances
are equally activist.
What the statement of the debate in activist-passivist terms
ignores by arguing about institutions is the inherent nature of the
articulation of basic organizational values found in any question of
law and the corresponding distributional effects of the chosen or
constructed opinion. Professor Tribe and Justice Rehnquist, having
pushed the debate to its final form, stated but did not examine a
difference which they characterized as one of degree, 03 but which is
actually an ideological divergence in attitudes toward natural law
or political theory.0 4 Perhaps, as indicated by Professor Radin, this
categorical distinction between the debaters' positions reflects an
epistemological problem inherent in the process of justification.'05
"The question will accordingly be in every case, not whether or
not the expression of one thing excludes everything else, but
whether we are to deny or affirm it for some other reason than its
axiomatic force, and it will be necessary to search for that other
reason." In all analysis of the judiciary's performance, therefore,
the chief concern should be the sufficiency of the justification for the
judicial version of the reconciliation of order and liberty based on
full explanation of the judges' assumed values.
Did the problem of activism always appear intractable? If so,
102. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 891. For the application of this argument to statutory
interpretation, see Radin, supra note 95. See also Wisotsky, supra note 51, at 187.
103. See note 71 supra.
104. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293,
293-307 (1976). Professor Shapiro's review of Justice Rehnquist's votes and opinions re-
vealed the Justice's strong ideological commitments, apparent in his decisions. Professor
Shapiro found, however, that Justice Rehnquist's theory of constitutional interpretation was
not always applied in practice. Through examination of three opinions by Justice Rehnquist,
the commentator suggested that instead of his strongly professed positivism, the Justice
demonstrated an extensive interventionist perspective based on states' rights. Id. at 293-99.
In the opinions, the Justice departed from a strict constructionist approach and instead re-
lied on policy considerations. Shapiro found this reliance on policy difficult to reconcile with
the Justice's professed distaste for government by an activist judiciary. Id. at 293-307. See
also notes 36-46 and accompanying text supra.
105. Living Constitution, supra note 20, at 698. See also Radin, supra note 95, at 865:
"[Slince what might be called judicial epistemology has a real importance in itself, the
technique of interpretation is never negligible." For an extended discussion of my assump-
tions, see Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE
L. REv. 671.
106. Radin, supra note 95, at 864.
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how did early antagonists reformulate the question? Much irreversi-
ble history and clarifying doctrine has passed since the early 1940's
with inevitable embarrassments for those writers who lacked the
benefit of hindsight which modern writers enjoy. Yet, the void in
judicial theory left by the drastic change in the Court during the
depression era demanded the creation of a new methodology for
justifying interpretations of law. 07 The Justices of the Supreme
Court in the early 1940's, like shipwrecked sailors, built their raft
as the necessity of the surrounding seas dictated. The framework
they seized still governs contemporary constitutional construction.
During the early 1940's, numerous claims of constitutional lib-
erty as a limit on the enforcement of majoritarian policy came be-
fore the Supreme Court, producing some of the most heated and
most inspiring prose in American letters.0 Perhaps in a later time
these Court opinions performed functions similar to the Federalist
Papers in crystalizing public debate on the future of American gov-
ernment. One need only read a brief sequence of the cases involving
constitutional rights decided during this period to recognize the
vital intellect and power of a Court which senses the times of its
deliberations and the necessity of its own competence.' Even cau-
tious men like Felix Frankfurter recognized the immense stakes
107. See note 93 supra.
108. We can see now what we could not have seen then, that from Jackson's
point of view, the moment of his accession was a crucial one. Holmes, Brandeis,
and Stone had triumphed. The Court had accepted the power of the legislature
to fashion popularly conceived solutions to passing economic problems. . . There
can be no doubt that the great men who composed this group still held fast to a
conception of a broad underlying constitutional structure. But what most ap-
peared at the time was the erosion of concepts, and the philosophy under the aegis
of which the erosion was taking place. It was a philosophy which had finally
become dominant in the schools, one which saw the law as a process which set
itself the task of continuously accommodating conflicting interests. Indeed, it is
nearly impossible for us today to think of the law in any other way.
Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. Rxv. 940, 941-42 (1955).
But while Justice Jackson caught the times, Justice Frankfurter did not.
[T]o assert that the court had no larger function in the protection of civil liber-
ties than of property rights was a fateful refinement in Frankfurter's position, a
departure from the view that he had appeared to endorse in his lectures, that some
rights stood higher than others in the hierarchy of values to be protected by the
Court. In this writer's view this refinement uncoupled him from the locomotive
of history. . . . Invoking the hallowed name of Holmes he pushed the doctrine of
judicial restraint to an extreme that violated the spirit of Holmes and separated
him from the most innovative members of the court.
Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in FROM THE DIAmES oF FEux FRANKFURTER 73 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (equal protection); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (first amendment); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)
(due process).
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involved in the decision of "which was to be master.""'  Early
suggestions for a new method floated as dicta, the most famous
being Justice Stone's footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products Co."' Tension and conviction saturated the pages of one
such epic battle, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette."2
In Barnette, a father, who was a Jehovah's Witness, sued on
behalf of his children who were forced to participate in a flag salute
each day, subject to expulsion from public schools, despite the stu-
dents' belief that to do so violated their understanding of Biblical
commands and risked their personal salvation. The State of West
Virginia argued that the need to instill national pride during World
War II justified mandatory flag salute regulations. While not the
only example, the Barnette case serves well as a proxy for the early
arguments about judicial activism for a number of reasons con-
nected to this symposium.
First, the case is an important landmark in its own right. Jus-
tice Jackson for the majority and Justice Frankfurter in dissent,
while both considered judicial conservatives," 3 presented classic
and self-conscious statements of the activism issue. "The whole
court is conscious that -this case reaches ultimate questions of judi-
cial power and its relation to our scheme of government.""'
110. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
111. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
113. For the best and most complete compilation and distillation of Justice Jackson's
judicial arguments, see Jaffe, supra note 108. Compare Kurland, Justice Robert H. Jackson
Impact on Civil Liberties, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 551, 555-59 (arguing that on the basis of the
Barnette opinion, Justice Jackson should be considered as a philosophical liberal rather than
a libertarian) with Fennel, The "Reconstructed Court" and Religious Freedom: The Gobitis
Case in Retrospect, N.Y.U. L.Q. 31 (1941) (characterizing Justice Jackson as a "liberal
constitutionalist," as opposed to Justice Frankfurter as a "liberal democratic jurist"). See
also Freund, supra note 96; Kurland, supra at 555.
Note that the denomination liberal refers to the political tradition of Hobbes, Locke and
Hayek. See generally, C. MACPHERSON, POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
Thus, it is possible to be both an institutional conservative and a theoretical liberal. That
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter shared the liberal tradition may explain much in contrast
with Justice Rehnquist's philosophical assumption. See Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 17-20
nn. 43-47 and accompanying text. See also E. GmART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE ROBERT H.
JACKSON 288-307 (1958). Gerhart defines Justice Jackson 'as a political liberal and a judicial
conservative. Id. at 305.
For an understanding of Justice Frankfurter's liberal philosophical tradition and judicial
conservatism, see P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1971) and
Lash, supra note 108, passim.
114. 319 U.S. at 667 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson referred to Barnette
as a case in which "[tihis issue [the extent to which majority rule will be set aside] has
been debated, but it has by no means been settled, and views shift as the occasion for judicial
intervention shifts from case to case." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 77 (1955) (footnote omitted).
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Second, a shared conservative attitude toward judicial policy-
making lends even the "activist" Justice Jackson credibility for all
factions in the modern debate and thus connects him to all partici-
pants in this symposium in interesting cross-currents. For example,
Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice Jackson and in his article, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, "' approved of Jackson's opinion in
Fay v. New York, 6 which described the constitutional form of indi-
vidual rights as "majestic generalities.""' Justice Jackson first used
the phrase to describe the fourteenth amendment in Barnette.",
Justice Rehnquist described the principle involved in both cases in
a way which shows that he acknowledges the institutional level of
the activism argument."' He embraces interpretation while reject-
ing explicit policymaking: "[W]here the framers of the Constitu-
tion have used general language, they have given latitude to those
who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen."'11
Professor Tribe cited Barnette frequently in his treatise as an exam-
ple of appropriate judicial protection of substantive values., Judge
Friendly, likewise, relied on Justice Jackson and his book, The
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy.' Judge Friendly, however, cited
Justice Jackson for the other side of the activism debate, which
corresponds to Justice Rehnquist's argument in The Notion of a
Living Constitution,'23 that explicit policymaking should be left for
a more appropriate political institution than the court. 2' Judge
Friendly also cited Justice Frankfurter for the same proposition.'2
Third, the 1940's debate closely parallels this symposium in
interesting ways. If Professor Tribe and Justice Rehnquist truly
differ only in degree and if their difference can be honed to a diver-
gent interpretation of Justice Jackson's "majestic generalities,"
then can the same be said of the Jackson-Frankfurter division in
Barnette? Are the conclusions reached by Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter determined on a level of the debate missed or misstated
by Professor Tribe aid Justice Rehnquist? Perhaps Judge Friendly's
115. Living Constitution, supra note 20, at 694.
116. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
117. Id. at 282.
118. 319 U.S. at 639.
119. See notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra.
120. Living Constitution, supra note 20, at 694.
121. See L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 589, 667, 862, 864, 871, 872, 890, 893, 899, 908, 961,
1011.
122. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 24 n.13.
123. Living Constitution, supra note 20, passim.
124. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 24 n.13.
125. See id. at 22.
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emphasis on what has been labeled here as the judging glass can
explain the difference between the positions taken by Justices Jack-
son and Frankfurter.
Fourth, the case presents a difficult set of facts for applying
Justice Rehnquist's institutional concerns. As a class action,
Barnette formally manifests the dual character of litigation and
thus fulfills Justice Rehnquist's definition of a social problem, a
personal dispute whose resolution implies similar results for those
similarly situated. 2 ' Barnette involved a claim of individual right
to liberty against a school board, a public institution which legis-
lates but which also has analogues in private education and in many
religious institutions. Preserving the fabric of this institution's deci-
sionmaking would have damaged the even more revered institutions
of the family and private religious institutions.' Admittedly, Jus-
tice Rehnquist only referred to examples of disputes between indi-
viduals and the institutions of which they are members. In aplural-
istic society, however, few individuals belong to or owe their primary
allegiance to only one institution. It is perhaps the exceptional dis-
pute, therefore, which does not concern more than one institution.
Although Professor Tribe also recognized that most disputes will
involve institutional relationships of some importance to the deci-
sion, '8 he, in contrast to Justice Rehnquist, stated:
[T]he resulting caution need not, and indeed must not, spell
automatic deference to the decisions of all groups ....
• . . [T]he adversary process is needed in order to maintain
the delicate balance between undue intrusion into the internal
lives of various autonomous groups and undue delegation to those
groups of potentially tyrannical authority over their members.2 ,
This was precisely the view of Justice Jackson:
It is my basic view that whenever any organization or combina-
tion of individuals, whether in a corporation, a labor union or
other body, obtains such economic or legal advantage that it can
control or in effect govern the lives of other-people, it is subject
to the control of the Government, be it state or federal, for the
Government can suffer no rivals in the field of coercion. Liberty
126. Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 2.
127. Id. at 4-5, 8-12.
128. Tribe, supra note 8, at 54-57.
129. Id. at 49-50. There is a curious inconsistency in Justice Rehnquist's position.
Compare Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 725-35 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) with Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 4-5 (approving of the majority's
decision). See generally Tribe, supra note 8, at 49-50 (fallacy of internal fairness).
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requires that coercion be applied to the individual not by other
individuals but by the Government after full inquiry into the
justification. 1 0
Fifth, in Barnette the Justices struggled to establish an appro-
priate standard for review of constitutionally suspect legislation in
part because the inchoate standard in the rationale of footnote four
in Carolene Products, 3' which supported expansive judicial scrutiny
of legislative infringements of fundamental liberties, remained mere
dictum until Barnette was decided. Justice Stone, in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,'3 the case overruled by Barnette, directly
applied his footnote four theory but in sole dissent:
I am not persuaded that we should refrain from passing upon
legislative judgment "as long as the remedial channels of the
democratic process remain open and unobstructed." This seems
to me no less than the surrender of the Constitutional protection
of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will. 3
This rationale bears striking resemblence to Professor Tribe's thesis
in Seven Pluralistic Fallacies.'3
Both Justices Jackson and Frankfurter begin with a recognition
of their duty in constitutional litigation. Justice Jackson stated,
"[t]he sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individ-
ual,"' 35 while Justice Frankfurter declared, "[a] grave responsibil-
ity confronts this court wherever in the course of litigation it must
reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority."'36 Neither
believed this task to be purely mechanical."7 Importantly, neither
believed the task demanded a methodology of instrumental balanc-
ing,"' apparently unlike Justice Rehnquist,13 although Justice
130. R. JACKSON, supra note 114, at 69. The inconsistency in Justice Rehnquist's position
becomes even more curious when one compares Jackson's statement to Rehnquist's reference
to authority as "not only the indispensable condition of all government, including self-
government, but it is the ultimate guardian against a state of anarchy in which only the strong
would be free." Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 17.
131. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
132. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
133. Id. at 605-06 (Stone, J., dissenting).
134. See Tribe, supra note 8.
135. 319 U.S. at 630.
136. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591. See also 319 U.S. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring).
137. Compare, Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (Jackson, J., majority opinion) with Barnette, 319
U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Jackson stated:
If official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed, what it shall
contain cannot be decided by courts, but must be largely discretionary with the
ordaining authority, whose power to prescribe would no doubt include power to
amend. Hence validity of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly
to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one,
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Frankfurter in subsequent years became one of the chief architects
of interest balancing.'40 Both believed that value or policy judg-
ments would enter the decision but that the need to use policy was
not the justification either for making policy judgments or a fortiori
for the decision itself. "No mere textual reading or logical talisman
can solve this dilemma. And when the issue demands judicial deter-
mination, it is not the personal notion of judges of what wise adjust-
ment requires which must prevail."''
The questions which divided Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
concern how much protection of individual choice to interpret into
the generalities of the first and fourteenth amendments and, thus,
how much to interfere with the internal authority of the school
board. As Justice Jackson put it: "The question which underlies the
the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so touching
matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the
individual by official authority under powers committed to any pol-
itical organization under our Constitution."'' Justice Jackson had
no trouble limiting legislative power substantively because of a par-
amount liberty interest: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts."''
But Justice Frankfurter replied, not that courts had no role in
presents questions of power that must be considered independently of any idea
we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question.
Id. at 634. And Justice Frankfurter wrote in his dissent: "Judges should be very diffident in
setting their judgment against that of a state in determining what is and what is not a major
concern, what means are appropriate to proper ends, and what is the total social cost in
striking the balance of imponderables."
Id. at 652.
The concurrence of Justice Murphy stands in contrast to both:
I am unable to agree that the benefits that may accrue to society from the compul-
sory flag salute are sufficiently definite and tangible to justify the invasion of
freedom and privacy that is entailed or to compensate for a restraint on the
freedom of the individual to be vocal or silent according to his conscience or
personal inclination.
Id. at 646.
139. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
140. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (advocating weighing competing interests of demands for free speech and for
national security). See generally P. KURLAND, supra note 113.
141. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596. Compare this with Justice Jackson's comments in
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
142. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-36.
143. Id. at 638. See also Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 604-05 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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protecting individual liberty,"' but that surely the majority also had
substantive interests:
[S]o long as no inroads are made upon the actual exercise of
religion by the minority, to deny the political power of the major-
ity to enact laws concerned with civil matters, simply because
they may offend the consciences of a minority, really means that
the consciences of the minority are more sacred and more en-
shrined in the Constitution than the consciences of a majority."5
This dilemma forced Justice Frankfurter to the conclusion that
judges lack the competence to second guess the legislative determi-
nation: first, because legislators, to the same extent as judges, have
a duty to understand and abide by the Constitution;' second, be-
cause courts lack institutional flexibility;" 7 and third, because edu-
cational institutions should set policy." 8 Justice Frankfurter con-
cluded that in light of these institutional factors counseling caution,
the legislative judgment to seek a clearly legitimate goal should be
upheld as a rational interpretation of the Constitution.' "In no
instance is this Court the primary protector of the particular liberty
that is invoked."' 50 This would seem a fairly standard, albeit inco-
herent, move, and thus one both Professor Tribe and Justice
Rehnquist move beyond.'5 ' All the institutional infirmities simply
imply the "fallacy of institutionalism"'52 if the Justice would be
144. Justice Frankfurter conceded that the courts do have a role in protecting individual
liberty, but "[blefore a duly enacted law can be judicially nullified, it must be forbidden
by some explicit restriction upon political authority in the Constitution." Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 666.
145. Id. at 662.
146. For those who pass laws not only are under a duty to pass laws. They
are also under a duty to observe the Constitution. And even though legislation
relates to civil liberties, our duty of deference to those who have the responsibility
for making the laws is no less relevant or less exacting. And this is so especially
when we consider the accidental contingencies by which one man may determine
constitutionality and thereby confine the political power of the Congress of the
United States and the legislatures of forty-eight states.
Id. at 667. See also id. at 649.
147. But the real question is, who is to make such accommodations, the
courts or the legislature? This is no dry, technical matter. It cuts deep into one's
conception of the democratic process-it concerns no less the practical differences
between the means for making these accommodations that are open to courts and
to legislatures. A court can only strike down. It can only say "This or that law is
void." It cannot modify or qualify, it cannot make exceptions to a general require-
ment.
Id. at 651-52.
148. See id. at 657-58.
149. See id. at 647.
150. Id. at 648.
151. See text accompanying notes 20 & 39. See also Tribe, supra note 8, at 44-46.
152. See Tribe, supra note 8, at 54-56.
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willing to state substantive principles and definitions of rights in
other contexts. "Had we before us any act of the state putting the
slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind
any member of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the
right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the
Constitution."'53 But neither Justice Jackson nor Justice Frank-
furter intended to end the discussion with these observations.
Justice Jackson met Justice Frankfurter's institutional chal-
lenge by connecting the institutional difficulties to the real roots of
the controversy, the assumptions they hold about the nature of
society and normative theories of social organization. At the heart
of his opinion, Justice Jackson articulated the notion of the Consti-
tution which prevails to our present day:
Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of
official authority depend upon our possession of marked compe-
tence in the field where the invasion of rights occurs. True, the
task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing
with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a
philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his
liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental re-
straints, and that the government should be entrusted with few
controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs. We
must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire
concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly
sought through closer integration of society and through ex-
panded and strengthened governmental controls. These changed
conditions often deprive precedents of reliability and cast us
more than we would choose upon our own judgment. But we act
in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force
of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of
our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold
the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this
Court when liberty is infringed."'
Observations about competence settle nothing if the judicial func-
tion preserves overarching values which inherently gain an evolu-
tionary yet concrete definition through judicial decisions. 55 Judicial
153. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also note 79 supra.
154. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639-40.
155. "The task of this Court to maintain a balance between liberty and authority is never
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decisions do articulate governmental values and thus, as a conse-
quence, control the distribution of governmental services in the
name of public good, whether or not judges like the fact and whether
or not they are conscious of the phenomenon. Judges can fulfill their
role of judgment only if their articulations can be justified consis-
tently with the shared fundamental assumptions of the present cul-
ture's understanding of the world or reality.
Crucially, Justice Frankfurter did not disagree:
One's conception of the Constitution cannot be severed from
one's conception of a judge's function in applying it. The Court
has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the pressures of
the day. Our system is built on the faith that men set apart for
this special function, freed from the influences of immediacy and
from the deflections of worldly ambition, will become able to take
a view of longer range than the period of responsibility entrusted
to Congress and legislatures. "'
Justice Frankfurter also did not wish to deny the emerging recogni-
tion of social interdependence over a view of society as an atomistic
aggregation of individuals: "The manifold character of man's rela-
tions may bring his conception of religious duty into conflict with
the secular interests of his fellow-men.' ' 7
Thus, while both Justices agreed that judges must interpret the
meaning of the Constitution, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the
institutional character of the judiciary while Justice Jackson ac-
knowledged and then dismissed the problem. But Justice Frank-
furter did not mean to justify his opinion on these grounds either.
The Justices' different views of the relevance of institutional compe-
tence symptomize a substantive diference over what values to
choose in justifying constitutional interpretation and how much
those values will be shaped by arguments cast in institutional form.
Before identifying the policy or value distinctions that existed
between Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, it is important to note
the similarity of their exchange to that of Professor Tribe and Jus-
tice Rehnquist. All four would agree that modern society consists of
more than an aggregation of individuals and that the recognition of
interdependence expands the notion of legitimate government in the
common interest. 158 This recognition, however, would lead Justices
done, because new conditions today upset the equilibrium of yesterday." American Commu-
nications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950) (Jackson, J.).
156. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 665.
157. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593.
158. Phillip Kurland, in analyzing Barnette, criticizes Justice Jackson as an exemplar
of "the liberal judicial creed with all its internal conflicts showing." Kurland, supra note 113,
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Frankfurter and Rehnquist to emphasize the preservation of order
and institutions as preconditions for liberty.' Justice Frankfurter
might easily be mistaken for Burke or Justice Rehnquist, in pas-
sages like the following:
But all these specific activities of government presuppose the
existence of an organized political society. The ultimate founda-
tion of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such
a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit
which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit
them from generation to generation, and thereby create that con-
tinuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civiliza-
tion.6 0
On the other hand, the same view of society would lead Profes-
sor Tribe and Justice Jackson to see with special clarity the defi-
ciencies of the political process: a short term orientation and plural-
istic intolerance for the nontraditional or powerless minority. The
deficiences create a need for access to the judiciary to complete the
larger political process of government. As Professor Tribe argued, "a
just and reasonably stable division of the burdens and benefits of
social and economic life"'' emerges from the interplay of the entire
federalistic structure. His argument implies the inclusion of the
judiciary as a functional unit of government. 12 By quoting Burke,
"'[people crushed by law have no hopes but from power. If laws
are their enemies, they will be enemies to laws,' "163 Professor Tribe
echoed Justice Jackson:
at 559. Kurland assumes that Justice Jackson believed the individual conscience to be impor-
tant from within a liberal framework. See note 113 supra. Kurland suggests a vision of society
as an aggregation of individuals which clearly requires all legitimate governmental action to
be representative of a majority of individual preferences. Thus, a tension is created by an
exercise of judicial review of legislation which, by definition, has been adopted by the repre-
sentatives of a majority.
Kurland, however, ignores Justice Jackson's rejection of this view in the "majestic gener-
alities" portion of the opinion. Justice Jackson valued the individual because individuals
must be treated similarly to stabilize their interdependence and their stake in the intricate
web of society. Thus, Justice Jackson's view of the judicial function included an independent
charge to preserve the social fabric through the articulation of fundamental values.
159. For an. articulation of Justice Rehnquist's position on the desirability of restricting
litigation to resolve particular disputes as a function of a weighing of the costs and benefits
of recourse to an adversary process, see notes 16-29 and accompanying text supra. For Justice
Rehnquist, the protection of traditional institutions is the object of government. Wisotsky,
supra note 51, at 175-76 & nn.12-21; see text accompanying notes 30-32, 55-59, 70 supra.
160. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596. See also text accompanying note 65 supra.
161. Tribe, supra note 8, at 43; see text accompanying note 153 supra.
162. Wisotsky, supra note 51, text accompanying n.37 at 179 & nn.133-34 at 197; see text
accompanying notes 41, 82-83 supra.
163. Tribe, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting 3 Th CORMESPONDENCE OF EDMUND BURKE 387
(T. Copeland ed. 1958).
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Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruc-
tion and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any
class, creed, party or faction. If it is to impose any ideological
discipline, however, each party or denomination must seek to
control, or failing that, to weaken the influence of the educational
system.'
For Professor Tribe and Justice Jackson, lasting interdependence
depends more on the allegiance fostered by fair treatment by the
collective group and the institutions maintained by the resources of
society than on the existence of unfettered authority for dominant
traditional interests.' Their shared view of the necessity of judicial
decision focuses the issue of legitimacy on the substantive values
which can be justified as articulations of constitutional rights. 6
What values were there at stake in Barnette? Justice Jackson's
famous defense asserted: "[I]f there is any fixed star in our consti-
tutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."'67 Justice Frankfurter seemed to agree: "So far
as the state was concerned, there was to be neither orthodoxy nor
heterodoxy."'18 But he continued, "[tihe constitutional protections
of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges . . . . Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.""' What was West Virginia's concern, religious proscription
of conscience or neutral call to secular duty? Apparently, the real
difference between Justices Jackson and Frankfurter occurs in the
formalized judicial understanding of the vital, dynamic tension be-
tween Jehovah's children and the patriotism of a society at war.
The two Justices seemed to be deciding two different cases.
According to Justice Frankfurter, "[aill that is in question is the
right of the State to compel participation in this exercise by those
who choose to attend the public schools . . . . It is a general non-
discriminatory civil regulation [which incidentally] touches con-
scientious scruples or religious belief of an individual or a group." 170
Not surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter stated the issue similarly in
164. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
165. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
166. See notes 86, 104-05 and accompanying text supra.
167. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
168. Id. at 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 650-51.
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Gobitis,17 ' as did the lower court in Barnette.' Justice Jackson,
however, rejected this putative question as an encapsulation of the
dispute over the mandatory flag salute:
The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argu-
ment in that case and in this, that power exists in the State to
impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in general.
The Court only examined and rejected a claim based on religious
beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned general rule. The ques-
tion which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such
a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude
may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under
powers committed to any political organization under our Consti-
tution.'
Thus, the articulation of the stakes as defined by the factual repre-
sentation symbolic of a living dispute may be outcome-
determinative; perhaps broadly favorable to the interests of the
individual (or plaintiff) while at the same time narrowly noncom-
mittal about the governmental interest (or defendant's)-or vice
versa-or any combination in between."' Ultimately, whether the
171. 310 U.S. at 392-93. Professor Richard Danzig develops the statement of the issue
through various stages of Justice Frankfurter's decision in a way which parallels this portion
of the discussion of Barnette. See Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frank-
furter's First Flag Salute Opinion, in SUPREME COURT REviEw 257, 260-61 (1977). For this
author's differences with Danzig, see note 200 and accompanying text infra.
172. Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D.W. Va.
1942). "Whether children who for religious reasons have conscientious scruples against salut-
ing the flag of the country can lawfully be required to salute it." Id.
173. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-36 (emphasii in original) (footnote omitted). See also D.
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR 227 (1962); Freund, supra note 96, at 13; Kurland, supra
note 113, at 556.
174. The articulation of the stakes as characterized by the perception of the framer of
the issue in a particular case controls the positioning of the issue on this continuum. On the
one hand, values commanding constitutional protection such as those of privacy, see, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), were perceived to outweigh the governmental
interests. By framing the issue with an emphasis on privacy, the Court in Griswold, felt itself
justified in striking down the law on the basis that no compelling state interest was present.
See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating regulation of contracep-
tives); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (subordinating the problem of litter created
by the distribution of handbills to the free exercise of first amendment rights).
On the other hand, when judges are favorably disposed towards a legislative act or
pronouncement they construct the factual setting of a case as one involving broad and com-
pelling state interests and only trivial, less compelling infringements on alleged individual
rights. This is particularly true in areas perceived as requiring subordination of certain per-
sonal values in exchange for progressive or general public benefits. See Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding legislation banning the advertis-
ing of cigarettes on the electronic media). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Buraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974) (zoning); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1963);
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
articulation completely controls the decision becomes irrelevant, for
it inherently affects the outcome. Platitudes about dreaded Platonic
guardians and preferences for democracy can never satisfy the re-
quirement of judgment, and thus can never procedurally define an
institutional debate under the labels of policymaking and deference.
Similarly, translating that procedural debate into comparative in-
stitutional advantages begs the same question by failing to control
the terms of the balance, the articulated values.
Justice Frankfurter was aware of the critical importance of lin-
guistic manipulation: "The precise scope of the question before us
defines the limits of the constitutional power that is in issue."'75 He
then stated his version, concluding that the statement of the issue
leads to a question of the allocation of governmental decisionmaking
in a way which suggests a reversal of the sequence of issue and
authority to decide: "[B]ut the real question is, who is to make
such accommodations, the courts or the legislature?"'7 6 His case for
legislative authority, in turn, was a residual of a well-developed, if
narrow, concept of the first amendment's protection of belief but not
incidental conduct.'" So long as belief is not directly coerced and
parents remain free to counteract the unconscious pressure of con-
formity, little legitimately protected liberty seems lost. But com-
Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 306, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
Between these examples of overriding interests of either the individual or governmental
claims lie those articulations that are not readily adapted to clear distinctions. Lines are
sometimes difficult to draw, particularly where two divergent claims of individual rights
conflict. The exercise of individual freedom in a peaceable manner calls forth no directive
for intervention by the state until the exercise of the freedom works to deny the rights of
others. "It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to deter-
mine where the rights of one end and those of another begin." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. The
judges' expression of the factual statement determines the perception of the rights involved,
the nature of the conflict and the nature and extent of the interference, and thus may well
control the outcome.
Paul Freund described the critical nature of the judging glass in Barnette:
On the sliding scale of measurement which is the constitutional judge's profes-
sional instrument, how vital was the secular observance without exemption as
compared with the offensiveness of it to a religious dissenter? This analysis was
avoided by Mr. Justice Jackson. He elected to minimize the religious factor and
to treat the problem under the aspect of freedom of the mind, or integrity of belief
whether or not religious in nature.
Freund, supra note 96, at 13 (footnote omitted). See also Danzig, supra note 171, at 257.
175. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 650.
176. Id. at 651.
177. Id. at 654; see Danzig, supra note 171, at 259. "The tendency to ask a question about
remedies in some cases and about rights in others is so frequently exhibited in Justice Frank-
furter's opinions that differential focusing might fairly be said to be a process central to the
functions of his jurisprudence." Id. Yet, Danzig did not add that Justice Frankfurter recog-




pare this very specific and particularized formula representing the
individual's interest with the sweeping evaluation of the govern-
mental interest in forced flag ceremonies in Barnette. Justice Frank-
furter's method of vaunting the government's interests in Barnette
reflected his manipulation of the judging glass in Gobitis, wherein
he stated: "We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the
hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national
security."1
8
Neither Justice Frankfurter nor Justice Jackson engaged in in-
terest balancing, preferring a decision justified by hierarchical val-
ues. But, if Justice Frankfurter had grounded his decision in a bal-
ancing of interests, his task would have been simple. 7 ' In reply,
Justice Jackson argued the inappropriateness of the social interest
identified by Justice Frankfurter:
It may be doubted whether Mr. Lincoln would have thought that
the strength of government to maintain itself would be impres-
sively vindicated by our confirming power of the State to expel a
handful of children from school. Such oversimplification, so
handy in political debate, often lacks the precision necessary to
postulates of judicial reasoning.10
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter disputed the persuasiveness of
their articulations of value, a persuasiveness which depends upon a
method of justification through linquistic argument.
The linguistic argument occurs as a definition of a certain sort
of values, those understood as the object of constitutional protection
and, therefore, as prior to political decisions. Justice Frankfurter
connected those values to a particular view of the human social
animal in a way which led to his conception of an enforceable con-
tent for the first amendment within a constitutional separation of
powers:
178. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595.
179. Justice Frankfurter declared that the law in question was enacted with a view
toward a legitimate end. Thus, "an act promoting gooditizenship and national allegiance is
within the domain of governmental authority and is therefore to be judged by the same
considerations of power and of constitutionality as those involved in the many claims of
immunity from civil disobedience because of religious scruples." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 654-
55. Justice Frankfurter supported this statement with "illustrations of conduct that has often
been compelled in the enforcement of legislation of general applicability even though the
religious consciences of particular individuals rebelled at the exaction." Id. at 655 (citing
Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (1793) (testimonial duties); Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245 (1935) (obligation to bear arms); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(compulsory vaccination); People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (1917) (compul-
sory medical treatment)).
180. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636.
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Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner
life of man. It rests in large measure upon compulsion. Socrates
lives in history partly because he gave his life for the conviction
that duty of obedience to secular law does not presuppose consent
to its enactment or belief in its virtue. The consent upon which
free government rests is the consent that comes from sharing in
the process of making and unmaking laws."'
Justice Jackson simply believed that the outward and inner lives of
individuals cannot be so clearly separated when the values in ques-
tion concern "self-determination in matters that touch individual
opinion and personal attitude."'82
Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious
symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated with many
of these symbols are appropriate gestures of acceptance or re-
spect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee. A person
gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one
man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.s,
A Justice's view of the relationship of the individual to the social
group ultimately governs both the statement of the legal issue in
question and the jurisdiction of the interpretation of legal language
which resolves it. As Professor Tribe has stated: "The judiciary has
thus reached into the Constitution's spirit and structure, and has
elaborated from the spare text an idea of the 'human' and a concep-
tion of 'being' not merely contemplated but required."'84 Justice
Rehnquist similarly demonstrated an undifferentiated and indivisi-
ble activism when he recommended an instrumentally weighted
value for traditional institutions, whether by interpreting the reach
of the underlying legal claim as in the case of Barnette, or by di-
rectly balancing institutional costs and benefits in deciding a ques-
tion of remedy, common law or compelling interest.8 5
If the opening quotation from Chief Justice Burger can be
trusted as metaphor, the current Supreme Court seems disposed to
argue on Justice Rehnquist's misleading terms.88 However, contem-
181. Id. at 655.
182. Id. at 631.
183. Id. at 632-33.
184. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 893.
185. "Any decision that declares the law under which a people must live or which affects
the powers of their institutions is in a very real sense political." R. JACKSON, supra note 114,
at 53. Justice Jackson also stated: "[Tihe people have seemed to feel that the Supreme
Court ... is still the ... custodian that our system affords for the translation of abstract
into concrete constitutional commands." Id. at 23. See note 138 and accompanying text
supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 1-7, supra.
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porary and subsequent commentary on the Barnette case, to a lim-
ited extent, has analyzed the opinions of the earlier period more
consistently with Justice Frankfurter's version of Humpty
Dumpty's tale.' 87 Typically, the comments focused on the argu-
ments for greater judicial scrutiny of legislative acts affecting civil
liberties than those affecting economic resources."' The reexamina-
tion in Barnette of the Court's role in preserving individual rights
was recognized as critical and fundamental:
Thus the cleavage between the views of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions raises a fundamental constitutional issue, which in
importance goes far beyond the significance of whether or not
school children shall be compelled to salute the flag. Future deci-
sions of the Court in the field of civil liberties will be closely
watched by all those interested in the trend which the Court will
take on this important question."'
Significantly, the question itself was framed on the assumption that
the point of interest was the justifications for treating differently the
areas of law involving economic relationships and personal choice,
rather than on a belief that judges should stay out of both areas.
"[fIf the Bill of Rights is to mean anything, the Supreme Court
must accept its responsibility of carefully scrutinizing legislation
which indicates a restriction of the civil liberties guaranteed by the
first ten amendments, because those liberties should occupy a more
exalted plane than other rights."'90
This responsibility could not be mechanical, deductive or
187. The contemporary criticism is fairly accurately reflected in D. MANWARINo, supra
note 173. The Gobitis case has been almost universally attacked. See, e.g., Fennel, supra note
113; Heller, A Turning Point for Religious Liberty, 29 VA. L. Rav. 440 (1943); The Gobitis
Case in Retrospect, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS Ray. 267 (1941); 26 CoRNELL L.Q. 127 (1940). The
commentary on Barnette usually applauds Justice Jackson and finds Justice Frankfurter
unpersuasive. Compare Nielson, Robert H. Jackson: The Middle Ground, 6 LA. L. REV. 381
(1944-46) and Powell, The Flag-Salute Case, NEw REPUBLIC, July 5, 1943, at 16 (incoherence
of Justice Frankfurter's view of the judicial function leading to the logical conclusion of
legislative absolutism) and 32 GEO. L.J. 93 (1943) (minority rights need protection) and 42
MICH. L. REV. 319 (1943) and 22 TEx. L. REV. 230 (1943) (Supreme Court must preserve the
values of the Bill of Rights) with Slade, Constitutional Law-Guaranty of Liberty-State
Law Requiring Public School Pupils to Salute the Flag Held Unconstitutional, 6 Gao. BAR J.
249 (1943-44) and 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 70 (1943) (frustration of the public will by minori-
ties).
In addition, many memorials written about Justice Jackson, after his death in 1954,
contain discussions of Barnette. See Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55
COLUM. L. REV 445 (1955); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. Rzv. 937 (1955);
Jaffe, supra note 108; Steamer, Mr. Justice Jackson and the First Amendment, 15 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 193 (1954); Weidner, Justice Jackson and the Judicial Function, 53 MICH. L. Rav.
567 (1955); Symposium--Justice Jackson, 8 STAN. L. Rzv. 1, 1-76 (1955).
188. See 32 GEo. L.J 93 (1943); 92 U. PA. L. REv. 103 (1943).
189. 92 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (1943).
190. 22 TEx. L. REv. 230, 235 (1944).
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objective.)'" "Justices may always have been sufficiently sophisti-
cated to know that the judicial process . . . is primarily political,
not judicial, but it is only recently that they have admitted as much
and have begun to discuss publicly their methods of deciding
cases."'' 2 This focus on methodology led to the understood connec-
tion between Justice Stone's footnote four in Carolene Products and
the basis of Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette. '9 3 The assump-
tion persisted that Justice Stone's rationale or something like it
must prevail. As Thomas Powell wrote, "judicial tolerance, if car-
ried to the extreme of the postulates in its favor, would mean the
denial of constitutionally secured liberties. Somewhere the line has
to be drawn, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has recognized in cases
where he has condemned or joined in condemnation."'' 4 Justice
Frankfurter's incoherence, as identified by Powell, arose from the
problem of generality. In the words of Professor Braden:
ity. In the words of Professor Braden:
Aside from all these theoretical difficulties with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's objective standard, there is the practical problem
of applying it to concrete cases. That he is aware of this is clear
from his acknowledgment that "judges among themselves may
differ," and his belief that "alert deference to the judgment of the
State court under review" will keep the differences under control.
He has said this cannot be "blind acceptance." He must, there-
fore, be saying that even though judges can agree on what is
society's opinion, he reserves the privilege of applying it his way.
But he cannot do that except by his own view of how best to
enforce the objective rules he finds. By the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, he will clothe society's abstrac-
tion with reality. The reality is his, not society's. "5
In short, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter fought an epic battle for
control of the judging glass, the same glass Judge Friendly holds
briefly to light in his contribution.
IV. HUMPTY DUMPTY'S REPLY AND THE PROBLEM OF LEVELS OF
GENERALITY
Through the extraordinary focusing power of the judging glass,
the opposing and potentially governing interests revealed in the
191. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
192. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 571
(1948) (footnote omitted) (citing Barnette as an example).
193. See 32 GEo. L.J. 93, 98 (1943).
194. Powell, supra note 187, at 17.
195. Braden, supra note 192, at 588.
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existential facts of each case can be surgically transformed into
linguistic forms which shape, in conjunction with other interpretive
functions, the written opinion and which thereby define the legal
rule applied to those interests. To be sure, others, entire traditions
in fact, have critiqued judges for leeways and loopholes in the judi-
cial method. Judge Frank's "fact skepticism"'' 6 and Karl Llewel-
lyn's "leeways of precedent,"'97 for example, bracket the exercise
being labeled by the metaphor of the judging glass.
Whether any one aspect of the process of deciding cases in
forms suitable for written communication consistently offers an in-
terpretive opportunity which can be independently outcome-
196. Compare J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 54-55 (1949) with K. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradi-
tion and Social Science Method, in JUISPRUDENCE 95-96 (1962). Both Judge Frank and
Professor Llewellyn concluded that the judge's interpretation of the facts of the case provides
at least a method, if not a cause, for a particular decision or result in a given case. In
transcribing into words on paper the transactions, statements and thoughts surrounding the
claim before the court, the judge, to use Llewellyn's words, "picks, leaves, emphasizes,.
slights, even twists" the facts to fit or predestine his conclusion. Id. at 95. Judge Frank, in
this regard stated:
The "facts," it must be never overlooked, are not objective. They are what the
judge thinks they are. And what he thinks they are depends on what he hears and
sees as the witnesses testify-which may not be, and often is not what another
judge would hear and see. Assume ("fictionally") the most complete rigidity of
rules relating to commercial transactions. . . .Still, since the "facts" are only
what the judge thinks they are, the decision will vary with the judge's apprehen-
sion of the facts.
J. FRANK, supra at 55 (quoting Frank, Are Judges Human? (pt. 1) 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 35-36
(1931)).
197. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 62-120 (1960). Professor Llewellyn
listed seven techniques judges use, or misuse, in order to achieve the desired result in a
particular case despite precedent which would seemingly dictate a contrary result. Among
these techniques, one is especially apt for this article. Llewellyn described it as follows: "The
older case, though significantly parallel in real facts, is brushed off because of the 'facts'
(artifacts often 'constructed') there, while a completely different manner of interpretation
and classification is used on the raw facts of the case in hand." Id. at 85. See also K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 196, at 70-71. Llewellyn's close analysis of the deduction process itself,
which to an extent underlies the system of stare decisis, reveals that there are inherent
margins of play in even the most tightly maintained syllogism. Even from an inductive
approach, the leeways available in utilizing any given precedent are vast. For an overview of
Llewellyn's ideas of manipulation of precedent, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 41-69.
See also J. FRANK, supra note 196, at 275-76. Judge Frank's analysis of precendential leeways
is typical of the many views expressed in the area. Expressing another popular ploy, Judge
Frank has catagorized some of the methods of avoiding undesirable precedent and has given
each method a name: (1) the "'Distinguishing' or 'Precise Question' Device," by which the
judge may avoid obnoxious precedent by emphasizing even the most trivial factual distinc-
tion ("But this car is yellow! (2) the "'Verbal Stability' Device," which method Judge
Frank claims judges use to simply alter the meanings of words just enough to accommodate
within a given precedent that which otherwise would lie without it; and (3) the "'Ratio
Decidendi' Device," where, by reevaluating cases making up an antagonistic strain of preced-
ent, judges can extract from hindsight new and different principles from the cases. They can
thus adjust to their liking the rule of law emanating therefrom. Id. at 275-80.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
determinative, or whether one aspect predominates as a favorite
tool at any given time, matters little. Whether the Barnette case
prefectly fits its proffered explanation and, thus, illustrates an ear-
lier recognition of one aspect of a broader issue inherent in linquistic
interpretation, may be even more problematic.' One seeks an em-
phasis, a certain recognition that debates about "activism" obscure
the vitality of the legitimately political aspects of judgment. Karl
Llewellyn, in fact, described the impact of the judging glass phe-
nomena during the era of the Barnette case. 9' What this comment
labels the "level of generality" problem and what Professor Danzig
calls "differential focusing,"' 0 Professor Llewellyn described in this
way:
[Judges] make the law by voicing what had not been voiced
before, and how they voice it. . . ,as well as in the sharp or loose
phrasing of the solving rule, and in the limitation or extension
and the direction of issue and of phrasing-that "how" is creation
by the judges.
21
198. See notes 114-33 and accompanying text supra.
199. See text accompanying note 198 infra.
200. Danzig, supra note 171, at 258. Compare Danzig with Llewellyn's statement follow-
ing this note in text. Danzig has written:
I suggest that contemporary circumstances were very important factors in the
case discussed here and that it was at the point of question framing that these
factors were most readily absorbed in the Justice's opinion. In general, I suggest,
the techniques of loading questions, whether by means of inflation or by differen-
tial focusing, permits simultaneous deference to two conflicting but greatly valued
imperatives. It gives play to a judge's sense of what is right and necessary in the
everyday world, while it preserves the purity of an opinion's legal logic.
Danzig, supra note 171, at 259. This author's differences with Professor Danzing are two-fold.
First, although Danzig, like the traditional caricature painted of the legal realist, identifies a
technique by which judges manipulate facts and reasoning to reach a conclusion they prefer,
he does not explain either: (1) whether he believes the judge could do otherwise; or (2) what
conclusion to draw about the norms of the judging craft from this manipulation. At least Karl
Llewellyn went beyond this stage to define a notion of the judicial function consistent with
this comment's assumptions. See Casebeer, supra note 105. Second, Danzig identifies the
technique of differential focusing as a discrete technique which the judge may use or not in
writing the opinion and, thus, which when present represents one part of the whole opinion.
In contrast, the level-of-generality notion structures the entire concept of the judicial func-
tion. The statement of the question represents only the most clear manifestation of an indivi-
sible whole which the opinion communicates as the interpretive process of moving from
presentation of a factual dispute through the manipulation of facts and legal standards to a
particularized statement of law. Differential focusing through the judging glass, properly
understood, is what judges do, simpliciter.
201. Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 1296. The problem of interpretation was recognized long
before it was addressed by Llewellyn or Danzig:
And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?
• ..When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can
know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of
them from report they obtain a true opinion about them, they judge without
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However, the critics of the realists, the current conservative
institutionalists on the present Court or even political liberals who
translate their values into institutional terms for debating purposes,
see only part of the story of judicial decisionmaking. The judicial
function decides disputes. It produces a service-resolved dis-
putes."' For the realists, one must strip away the trappings of a
formalistic method that hides the real reasons or causes of this end
result or, for others, cheats democracy by making unauthorized pol-
icy. But this clearly correct impulse to discover the motivation for
the decision arguably creates a tunnel vision which deemphasizes
as it acknowledges the written nature of the judicial function.2
Judges write opinions and steadily expand their length for an
important reason: judicial decisions must be justified. The exercise
of raw political power decides cases, to be sure, but judges do not
describe their function in that way; and yet after the realists, judges
cannot deny the scope for policymaking hidden in the mechanism
of decision. Assuming some need for dispute resolution by a
"neutral" third party, choice, judgment, and not fears of usurped
democracy or institutional inflexibility or any of the other fallacies
Professor Tribe persuasively dispatched, carry the indwelling need
knowledge and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. .... And yet,
0 my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect
judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer
that they are not the same.
PLATO, THEAETguS 72 (B. Jowett, trans. 1949) (footnote omitted). See also note 207 and
accompanying text infra.
202. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
203. At one point during the heyday of the realists, Karl Llewellyn described the judging
glass function among a list of numerous techniques by which precedents are manipulated to
reach a preconceived result. "One observes the level of silent application or modification or
escape, in the 'interpretation' of the facts of a case, in contrast to that other and quite distinct
level of express wrestling with the language of the paper rule." Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris-
prudence-the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. RED. 431, 450 (1930), reprinted in LLEWELLYN, JURIs-
PRUDENCE, supra note 196, at 24. See also, Braden, supra note 192, at 576-77.
If the opinion of the Court were significant only as a justification of the action
taken in the case before it, the entire range of verbal legerdemain might be safely
employed. Unfortunately, the Court's every word must be set down with an eye
to its meaning in the future in similar situations, in analogous situations, even in
irrelevant situations.
Id. Similarly, Professor Kantorowicz wrote:
The realists' conception of the Law, their substantive thesis, is therefore: the Law
is not a body of rules, not an Ought, but a factual reality. It is the real behavior
of certain people, especially of the officials of the Law, more especially of the
judges who make the Law through their decisions, which, therefore, constitutes
the Law.
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1243 (1934).
As Professor Jaffe summarized, "to the simon-pure 'realist' each conflict was to be
apprehended and evaluated in terms of its overwhelming immediacy, of its current complex
of 'realities."' Jaffe, supra note 108, at 942.
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for justification. Other institutions may determine the occasions for
judicial choice by setting jurisdiction or justiciability require-
ments214 or they may engage in the ongoing dialogues of governance
which modify judicial choices in subsequent enforcement or legisla-
tion. Such acts by other institutions will channel the kinds of justi-
fying arguments which will be persuasive, but the necessity to jus-
tify is preestablished by the idea of judgment. Judgment requires
criteria of choice and if choice can no longer believably refer to an
objective prior source, given the subjectivity of human fulfillment
of any role, the criteria must evolve internally to the decision."5
Because this function is ongoing, judgment in a form which can be
used analogically for the guidance and the justification of future
cases requires a retrievable form, the written opinion.2°0
The judging glass produces the central interpretive structure of
an opinion, the transformation of the dispute into linguistic forms
capable of analogic or legal reasoning. 2 01 The most obvious manifes-
tation of this central structure appears in the framing of the issue.
But phrasing the issue is simply the most obvious manifestation,
and it not surprisingly appears as such by linguistic necessity. As
Karl Llewellyn, perhaps the only realist not clearly subject to this
comment's critique, observed: "Behaviour is too heterogeneous to
be dealt with except after some artificial ordering. The sense im-
pressions which make up what we call observation are useless unless
gathered into some arrangement."2' 8 The arrangement chosen by a
judge assumes a particular form, following function. Yet, because
the judicial function is an interpretive one, function depends on the
form of interpretation created by the written articulation of judicial
argument. Form and function are inevitably united by the interpre-
tive structure of judgment. The entire written opinion constitu-
tively decides the object of litigation: the settlement of a dynamic
204. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); note 14 and accompanying
text supra.
205. See Casebeer, supra note 105, at 684-94.
206. See note 203 supra.
207. The extent to which a concept of realistic structuralism can be defined as a useful
method of criticism, and thus of judicial methodology, constitutes the subject of my current
research. I do not mean to use the concept of structure rigorously in this article and therefore
make no reference to any particular school of structuralism.
208. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 196, at 27.
209. 1 use "constitutive" in the same sense as Roberto Unger does when he distinguishes
constitutive, technical, instrumental and prescriptive rules:
Constitutive rules define a form of conduct in such a way that the distinction
between the rule and the ruled activity disappears. It has been said that the rules
of games and the rules of logic are of this sort. The moves of a game and thus the
game as a whole are defined by its rules.
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLMCS 68-69 (1975).
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dispute captured by the judging glass as the clarification of the
relevance of government for social relationships, rules of law, and
sometimes constitutional rights.
Two conclusions follow from these observations. First, the judi-
cial decision cannot be characterized as a discrete act of government
accompanied by a written articulation and justification as a record
of the act. The judicial decision, while certainly a governmental act
and thus inherently political, does not consist solely of a ruling.
Rather, the governmental process of the judicial decision unfolds
through and thus is a written articulation of values to which other
governmental institutions react in greater or lesser understanding
and efficiency. Part of their reaction includes legislative adjustment
of the relations of disputants whose fight composes the raw material
of the process.
Second, the forms of the judicial decision process, linguistic
arguments built into a written opinion, communicate and in turn
shape the articulation of social values inherent in interpreting legal
claims. Therefore, the forms chosen in the particular case also need
to be explained and thus implicitly justified. Of course, many judges
write no opinions, but this empirical artifact only suggests that the
work which opinion writing accomplishes has been completely inter-
nalized for some kinds of disputes at some levels of judging. The
more critical point remains the inherent risks of the judging glass
extracting from a vital, dynamic life situation presenting a different
face to every observer, the inappropriate level of generality of the
legal stakes. The judicial "decision" is a nondiscrete episode em-
bodied in a written articulation within the continuous process of
justifying dynamic social values which need clarification at the be-
hest of correctly interested parties. The justification emerges inter-
nal to the rationalization of the demands presented by the "factual"
context in a society of interdependent individuals which persuade
the reader of the social need for the judicial mode of governance.
Opinion equals decision equals justification, and no society which
wishes to remain a society escapes the task, if not the institution.210
Judge Friendly's article explored the level-of-generality pheno-
menon in relation to the judicial duty of justification mainly in his
210. Without order there is no group life, there is no group. If the members
of a group do not . . . manage to live together, if their respective conduct is not
to some degree oriented with reference to each other. . . you have no group. . ..
Settlement of disputes, in any fashion, means reestablishment of the old order,
or as the case may be, a new establishment of a somewhat different order in the
group.
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 108 (emphasis in original).
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discussion of Brown v. Board of Education"' and Roe v. Wade.2 12
Before turning to these cases, Judge Friendly explained why the
level-of-generality problem inheres in justified judgments: "Some
provisions of the Bill of Rights invite the courts to develop and then
to apply notions of social policy. 213 Judge Friendly cited the con-
cept of cruel and unusual punishment as a phrase which is not static
but must continually be reexamined in light of "evolving standards
of decency. 2 1 But Judge Friendly indicated that it would be a
mistake to conclude, because such concepts seem open-ended, that
the judicial role is intrinsically different there from the role the
courts play when they are dealing with seemingly more narrow and
precise language. To show that even the most narrow phrases over
time have been subject to changing interpretations, he cited the
language of the first amendment: "Congress shall make no law
.... '215 To ask a judge to avoid making a partially subjective
judgment is to ask for the impossible: "The question is not whether
but to what extent .... -216
In analyzing Brown,27 Judge Friendly observed that: "Social
policy entered the decision at two points-the Court's emphasis on
the special importance of education and its determination that sep-
arate education was 'inherently unequal.' ",218 Thus, he equated
the latter interpretive problem of open-ended legal rules with the
interpretive problem of how generally to characterize the problem
of discrimination involved in Brown. Judge Friendly thought that
tying the unjust discrimination involved in separation of the races
to the importance of education was an effort to justify the decision
at the wrong level of generality because that choice of nexus forced
the judges to utilize psychological and sociological data that is
more appropriately utilized to justify shifting legislative arrange-
ments. Judge Friendly thought several more appropriate jural
principles could have been constructed on the facts of Brown and
used to interpret the Constitution.2 1
211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
213. Friendly, supra note 11, at 27.
214. Id. at 28 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
- 215. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Friendly, supra note 11, at 28.
216. Friendly, supra note 11, at 28.
217. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) held that the separate but equal
doctrine, adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 193 U.S. 537 (1896), is not applicable to public
education.
218. Friendly, supra note 11, at 29.
219. Judge Friendly explained his concept of generality:
Several such bases could have been derived from the text and the history of the
equal protection clause. The Court might have gone to the full extent of saying
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If the Court had taken any of these courses, it would not have
been subject to the criticism that it was using psychological evi-
dence of dubious validity, . . . as the justification for substitut-
ing its factual judgment that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal" for the legislature's factual judgments
that they were not. 0
The choice of what the facts stand for cannot be neutral. As Judge
Friendly continued: "Admittedly, the jural bases suggested above
are not interchangeable; each would have consequences different
from the Brown opinion and from each other for such issues as the
appropriate remedy for de jure segregation, what was to be done
about de facto segregation and the constitutionality of reverse dis-
crimination."'' 1 Where the claim becomes a jural principle further
defining the evolving standards of constitutional, statutory or com-
mon law, there exists an inescapable need to explain why the facts
yield a particular putative claim for judicial protection.
Sometimes the constitutional language being interpreted
forces an explicit judicial focus on the level of generality with which
the factual dispute will be viewed. Justice Jackson argued. that the
justification of an equal protection decision depends primarily upon
which justifiable characterization of the facts the judges choose:
[T]here is no more effective practical guarantee against arbi-
trary and unreasonable government than to require that the prin-
ciples of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbi-
trary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus
that any governmental classification based on race was a denial of equal protec-
tion. It might have said, less broadly, that any racial classification imposed by a
majority upon a minority constituted such a denial. It might have said, still less
broadly and with a view to the particular evil that gave rise to the writing of the
fourteenth amendment, that any racial classification imposed upon blacks vio-
lated the equal protection clause. It might have said, as Professor Goodman has
suggested, that since a racial classification is constitutionally suspect, the state
had the burden of showing that such classification did no harm, and the finding
of the Kansas district court and the opinions of the psychologists were relevant,
although not really necessary, to show how far the state had fallen short of dis-
charging that burden. Finally, in light of the doctrine that has since developed,
the Court could have said that any racial classification must be shown to be
required by a compelling interest and that the state had'not done so.
Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted) (citing Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. Rv. 275 (1972)).
220. Friendly, supra note 11, at 31 (footnote omitted).
221. Id. (footnote omitted). For a complete analysis of these issues and the conse-
quences of judicial decisions on each, see Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275 (1972).
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to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if large numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws
be equal in operation.2
Recent decisions, particularly in the area of gender discrimina-
tion, have recognized variable standards of rationality which the
classification of individual status for governmental purposes must
meet to avoid unconstitutional arbitrariness . 23 Thus, the need for
judicial review of legislative acts has been translated into legal stan-
dards defining equal protection of the laws. It is no accident that
the problem of interpretation of constitutional texts which define
individual rights collapses into the problem of interpretation of the
facts of a dispute over rights, for the legal standard concerns which
situational contexts should remain personal and beyond the reach
of political regulation and which should be treated similarly to other
situations legitimately subjected to majoritarian control. For exam-
ple, in Craig v. Boren, 22 Justice Brennan attacked the use of
"archaic and over broad" generalizations that courts had previously
used to justify their decisions in similar cases:
[Increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of
females in the home rather than in the "marketplace and world
of ideas" were rejected as loosefitting characterizations incapable
of supporting state statutory schemes that were premised upon
their accuracy. In light of the weak congruence between gender
and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent,
it was necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt proce-
dures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered gen-
eralization actually comported with fact.
2 5
222. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring); see Kurland, supra note 113, at 572-73. Kurland, however, saw Justice Jack-
son's view as important only as related to doctrinal results and not as tied to a deeper view
of constitutional structure and the judicial institution. Thus, Kurland missed the directional
force of Justice Jackson's analysis in Railway Express for the decision in Barnette and for
the continuity between Railway Express and warren Court decisions. For the development
of this argument, see the discussion of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), in notes 263-70
and accompanying text infra.
223. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1
(1972).
224. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 on the grounds of
gender-based discrimination).
225. Id. at 198-99 (citation omitted).
That the approval or deferral of a legislative factual stereotype as rational must be
grounded in principles of accuracy and fairness, as indicated by Justice Jackson, should be
obvious from the Court's opinion in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (uphold-
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Thus, while the level-of-generality problem stems from the
interpretation of fact necessary to judgment, regardless of the legal
question, when the question is one of constitutional rights, the gen-
erality problem is heightened. The level of generality itself is an
object of interpretation because the concept of a constitutional right
universally applies to all individuals as members of the society.
However, while certain statutory phrases and constitutional alloca-
tions or limitations of authority facially highlight the generality of
a case's factual force, the same, if more hidden, impacts occur in
other doctrines. In a sense, all fourteenth amendment claims,
whether based upon equal protection or due process raise the same
question: whether the legislature has demonstrated sufficient ra-
tionality to justify the need to regulate personal choices or personal
status under the name of the common welfare.ul
Decisions concerning substantive due process protection of pri-
vacy illustrate the intensified focus on the level-of-generality prob-
lem in cases arising under the fourteenth amendment. Not surpris-
ingly, the speakers at this symposium used these cases in support
of their arguments. In his awesome work, American Constitutional
ing an Illinois law prohibiting the practice of law by women), a case from the Court's now
discredited formalistic period.
In his concurring opinion in Bradwel, Justice Bradley stated:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender . . . The constitution of the family organiza-
tion, which is founded in divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. . . .The paramount destiny and mission of woman are
[sic] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). I am indebted to Linda Furman, one of my students, for
this observation.
226. For the bridging doctrine which makes clear the liberty and equal protection sides
of the fourteenth amendment coin, compare the pronouncement and use of irrebuttable
presumptions as a part of judicial decisionmaking by Justices Stewart and Powell in Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (challenging mandatory maternity leave
without pay as violative of the fourteenth amendment). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Powell reexamined the "irrebuttable presumption" rationale used by Justice Stewart's opin-
ion for the majority and deemed the "equal protection analysis" to be "the appropriate frame
of reference." Id. at 651. Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority held the mandatory
maternity leave rule violative of the due process clause "because of their use of unwarranted
conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the exercise of protected constitutional lib-
erty." Id.; see Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 269 (1975). Professor
Tribe advanced three categories of constitutional limitation encompassed by the concept of
due process: (1) substantive "constraints upon the policies government may seek to imple-
ment;" (2) procedural, "constraints upon the methods by which govenmentally chosen poli-
cies may be enforced;" and (3) structural, focusing on "the structures through which policies
are both formed and applied, and formed in the very process of being applied." Id. at 269
(emphasis in original).
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Law, Professor Tribe27 noted the impact of the level-of-generality
in his criticism of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney,"' involving the constitutionality of
enforcing penal statutes against sexual activities between consent-
ing adults.229
The eventual unfolding of doctrine in this area will confront
one methodological problem that it would be useful to examine
here. Insofar as the right of personhood is limited to liberties long
revered as fundamental in our society, it makes all the difference
in the world what level of generality one employs to test the
pedigree of an asserted liberty claim. . . . It is crucial, in asking
whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to
define the liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit
unconventional variants to claim protection along with main-
stream versions of protected conduct.230
Professor Tribe connected the justification of the scope of the pri-
vacy protection to the desideratum that courts must be sensitive to
include both popular and unpopular exercise of rights when defining
basic values "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple to be ranked as fundamental." 23' Clearly, the notion of justifica-
tion requires as much, but furthermore, the justification is particu-
larly judicial, as is Judge Friendly's notion of jural principle and
Justices Jackson's and Frankfurter's notion of judges protecting
long term values from short term majoritarian manipulation against
minorities. Thus, Professor Tribe emphasized the fundamental
value of a just third party process for dispute resolution, particularly
for access to those disfavored or discriminated against in the politi-
cal process. Therefore, the process itself must be conceived as a
value of the resolution. Unlike the realists, at least in their usual
portrayal, 2 Professor Tribe did not require separating the decision
227. At this point a slight unfairness to Professor Tribe must be confessed. Although
Professor Tribe's contribution at this symposium has been criticized because he confined his
analysis to the terms of the activism-deferral dichotomy, he has emphasized the fundamental
value of a just third-party process for dispute resolution. See L. TmBE, supra note 84.
228. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
229. The federal court refused to grant relief against enforcement or threatened enforce-
ment of Virginia's sodomy laws prohibiting male homosexuality. Thus, the privacy and per-
sonal choice protection of acts and conduct in the fourteenth amendment only relates to
traditional relationships, such as elements of marriage or family life viewed from a historically
approved and sanctioned perspective. Id.
230. L. TamE, supra note 84, at 944-45 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at ch. 15.
231. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
232. See Casebeer, supra note 105.
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as a consequence of the judicial function from the process of deci-
sion .23
The history of the new substantive due process can be viewed
as a shift in the focus of the judging glass on disputes over govern-
mental limitations of personal choice, almost as a microscope shifts
powers to reveal greater definition or broader environments within
its slides. Judge Friendly, in fact, believes the protection of choice
now exceeds the generality of privacy and should thus-be recognized
as a right of personal autonomy.2 3 Beyond merely increasing the
volume of restatements of liberty, the expansion of constitutional
protections of privacy involves a notable style of argument. The only
difference between the later, broad holdings and the initial formula-
tions lies in the expansion of the characterization of the factual
issue. 35 The same notions of personal autonomy used to justify the
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut 38 were subsequently used to
justify the protections of privacy in Carey v. Population Services
International2' 7 and Whalen v. Roe.1
38
Liberty under the fourteenth amendment, as defined in
Griswold, includes a protection of privacy which prohibits the en-
forcement of a ban on the use of contraceptives because such en-
forcement intrudes into the sacred marital bedroom, or perhaps
alternatively, because privacy protects against governmental acts
which inhibit a full exploration of intimacy in marriage. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,131 the generality of the protection of such
choices extended to individuals in the exercise of personal sexual
practices (at least those that are "traditional"): "If the right of
233. See L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 13-14. In the context of all his writings, Professor
Tribe, with characteristic clarity, connected process and product. See Tribe, Policy Science:
Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. Arr. 66 (1972-73); Tribe, Technology Assess-
ment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L.
Rxv. 617 (1973); Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Envi-
ronmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
234. Friendly, supra note 11, at 35. But see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), holding
that a New York statute requiring recordation of prescriptions for certain drugs and providing
safeguards to prevent unauthorized access to or use of the records in the state's possession
not to be violative of any right protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court
recognized the right of privacy as encompassing the "individual interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters" and "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," the statutory scheme was viewed not to "pose a sufficiently grievous
threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation." Id. at 599-600.
235. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977) and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) and Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Friendly, supra note 11, at 36-37.
236. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
237. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
238. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
239. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child." 40 By 1976, in Carey, Justice Brennan
asserted: "Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State. ' 24' Judge
Friendly's notion of personal autonomy 2 2 seems more appropriate
than the limitation of due process which Justice Stevens articulated
as the common denominator of privacy protection in Whalen. Jus-
tice Stevenswrote: "The cases sometimes characterized as protect-
ing 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions. ' 243 This level-of-
generality in the definition of liberty evolves through the cases as
each case suggests to the Court a factual restatement of the consti-
tutional principle which can be justified in an opinion explaining
the resolution of an adversary dispute.
24'
Judge Friendly focused on the abortion question and Roe v.
Wade l4 as an example of a correct decision from any realistic view
of the facts, but one poorly justified by the written opinion which
too broadly generalized the legal form of the resolution of the partic-
ular dispute.2 6 The Wade facts create a difficult task for the manip-
ulators of the judging glass. Judges must avoid preoccupation with
the transforming of facts into potential components of a jural argu-
ment (the intended product of the focusing process), causing them
240. Id. at 453.
241. 431 U.S. at 687. See generally 32 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 750 (1978).
242. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 35.
243. 429 U.S. at 598-600.
244. See L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 886. Professor Tribe described Whalen as the "most
comprehensive attempt thus far to define the constitutional right of privacy." Id. For a
different approach to the judicial process, see E. LEvi, supra note 13. Instead of deducing the
doctrinal solution to a given factual dispute from an established, or evolving, principle, judges
decide by a "process of determining similarity or difference," id. at 3, that is "reasoning by
example." Id. at 1. While individual cases may appear to be decided on the basis of a set
rule, that rule emerged from the process of reasoning by example. Thus, legal reasoning is
circular. Factual situations are compared and judgments are made, a rule is derived from
prior judgments and the rule is then "applied" to other situations judged as similar. The
actual process, however, is not the application of a rule but the classification of a given factual
situation as sufficiently similar to other situations so that it may be treated similarly.
245. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
246. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 32, 33-34. "[C]onsiderations of social policy
militating against [abortion statutes] were strong indeed . . . . Ultimately, however, one
must face the question of how this overwhelming social case could be translated into a
principle of constitutional law .... " Id. at 32-33.
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to forget that justifications cannot be divorced from the implicit
demands of real, ongoing social problems.247 Just as the discourse
must be general enough to protect liberty, it must be specific enough
to be identified through the facts as meaningfully addressing the
underlying social problem brought to the courts in the structure of
a two-party litigation. 4 Judge Friendly noted that sociological data
appropriately explained which factual aspects of the dispute require
transformation through the judging glass into potential jural princi-
ples. 4' The data explains rather than justifies the judgment in
Wade, for the same reasons given by Judge Friendly in observing
that the mere analysis of data does not accomplish the justificaion
of the judgment in Brown."'° Sociological data arguably controlled
the Brown decision on the assumption that if education were, in
fact, unequally achieved by separation of races, equal protection
would be denied. But justification depends upon the persuasiveness
of the entire case for the chosen postulates, communicated through
the consequences of the decision and confirmed by later episodes
within the judicial process."' To Judge Friendly, the weakness of the
Wade opinion stemmed from inadequate emphasis on the realities
of serious injury and death due to illegal abortions252 and the dispro-
portionate number of the poverty stricken suffering such injuries.21 3
These factors should have been involved in translating "a case of
such overwhelming social import" into a legal principle. As Judge
Friendly stated: "Justice Blackmun must have been fully aware of
all this, as witness the final paragraph of his subsequent dissent in
Beal where he condemns the majority for refusing to recognize the
realities of poverty.2 54
247. See generally Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. Rav. 886
(1930); Radin, supra note 95. Radin explained the interpretation problem in terms of statu-
tory construction. He suggested that, in deciding whether to apply a strict or liberal construc-
tion to a statute, judges should refer to a "competent calculus of probable consequences."
Id. at 885. Landis replied that judges should restrict themselves to finding the intent of the
legislature and then applying that intent without unnecessary judicial interference. Landis,
supra at 889-90.
248. There is another confusion, found in dealing with rules, and strength-
ened by the associated idea of rights, within the field of doctrine itself. Having
come to regard words as sound bases for further thinking, the tendency is well nigh
inevitable to simplify the formulations more and more: to rub out of the formula-
tions even the discrepancies in paper doctrine which any growing system of law
contains in heaping measure. ...
Llewellyn, supra note 203, at 440.
249. See Friendly, supra note 11, at 33-35.
250. See id. at 29-32.
251. For a detailed discussion of Brown and its progeny, see Goodman, supra note 221.
See generally Radin, supra note 95.
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Although this commentary will not enter the mammoth debate
on abortion, Judge Friendly's mention of the Supreme Court's most
recent decision in the area, Maher v. Roe,25 is interesting in several
respects. First, Judge Friendly's criticism of the Wade decision, that
the judging glass was improperly focused, will be borne out if the
infirmity which he isolated exists in a subsequent decision, for ex-
ample, Maher. Second, since Maher involved a question of equal
protection, the level-of-generality issue appears in the case by the
very nature of the right itself."' Third, a comparison of Maher and
the lower court opinion in Barnette finds a remarkably similar dis-
pute underlying both, but Barnette, unlike Maher, arose it in a due
process context. '7
In Barnette, when Judge Parker stated the question for decision
as "[wihether children who for religious reasons have conscientious
scruples against saluting the flag of the country can lawfully be
required to salute it,"2"' the principle he drew from the fact situation
centers on the effect of withdrawal of the public benefit of education
in order to coerce religious conduct. "If they are required to salute
the flag, or are denied rights or privileges which belong to them as
citizens because they fail to salute it, they are unquestionably de-
nied that religious freedom which the Constitution guarantees."259
When government grants a benefit, it cannot do so in a way which
coerces rather than simply affecting individual choices protected as
fundamental under the Constitution.2
60
In the Supreme Court's opinion in Barnette, Justice Frank-
furter in dissent responded that education is only an opportuunity
and can be conditioned in its, provision: 26'
255. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
256. See text accompanying note 223 supra.
257. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
258. Barnette v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (1942).
259. Id. at 253.
260. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventist may not
be denied unemployment benefits solely because religion proscribed working on Saturdays).
261. 319 U.S. at 656. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion):
Here appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than
for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of [the] service." But the very
section of the statute which granted him that right, a right which had previously
existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the
procedure by which "cause" was to be determined, and expressly omitted the
procedural guarantees which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution
.... Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural mecha-
nism for enforcing the substantive right which was simultaneously conferred, we
decline to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from




But the practical opportunities for obtaining what is becoming in
increasing measure the conventional equipment of American
youth may be no less burdensome than that which parents are
increasingly called upon to bear in sending their children to par-
ochial schools because the education provided by public schools,
though supported by their taxes, does not satisfy their ethical and
educational necessities.
2 2
Judge Parker might have answered, if given the opportunity,
that Justice Frankfurter's observations were irrelevant even if cor-
rect: Judges cannot escape the level-of-generality problem so easily.
Of course educational benefits, such as the amount of education and
the range of curriculum, offered members of the public can be condi-
tioned,"'3 but at some point the conditions realistically move beyond
affecting and inducing to coercing a form of exercise which reduces
religious freedom. At some point the secular purpose of legislation
must confront limits given the "manifold character of man's rela-
tions."2"4 Interdependence forces a limitation on authority in the
name of liberty as much as limitation of liberty in the name of
order.265 As Judge Parker concluded, "[tihere is not a religious
262. 319 U.S. at 657. But see D. MANWARING, supra note 173, at 230-31; 26 CORNELL L.Q.
127, 129 (1940): "A patent objection to this argument is that attendance at some school is
required, and frequently the parent cannot support his child at a private school. In such a
situation, it seems mere verbiage to speak of a 'choice."'
263. Justice Jackson did not deny that the state may condition educational benefits. The
conditions, however, must be instituted pursuant to a legitimate state power. In Hamilton
v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), a requirement that university students undergo military
training was upheld. In Barnette, Justice Jackson distinguished Hamilton on two grounds:
(1) attendance at a university is voluntary as opposed to compulsory public education; and
(2) the state is explicitly granted the power to raise militia and may employ reasonable means
to do so, but the state has no such power to compel adherence to a given political doctrine.
319 U.S. at 632.
264. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940).
265. For example, consider procedural due process. Pure positivism, as illustrated by
Justice Rehnquist's approach in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), pretends that
procedural due process can be defined by the legislature internally to the claim of right it
grants. Yet, as Justice Powell argued, the right to due process "is conferred, not by legislative
grace, but by constitutional guarantee." Id. at 167. See also id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
Once the question for decision is the judicial application of a claim of constitutional
guarantee to a particular set of facts, including the substance of a statute, the level-of-
generality problem which inheres in judgment (who will be protected to what extent in what
choices as framed by these facts) becomes integral to the notion of right. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 84, at 891. Thus, pure positivism of the sort advocated by Justice Rehnquist eliminates
the problem of generality only by eliminating the notion of procedural due process itself. See
also Shapiro, supra note 104, at 323-25.
Professor Thomas Reed Powell lodged the same attack in principle against Justice
Frankfurter's similar statement of the conditioned educational benefit in Barnette. "Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's feeling for a judicial duty of equal deference to legislative judgments
whatever the interests and the ideals at stake points strongly in the direction of legislative
absolutism." Powell, supra note 187, at 18.
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persecution in history that was not justified in the eyes of those
engaging in it on the ground that it was reasonable and right and
that the persons whose practices were suppressed were guilty of
stubborn folly hurtful to the general welfare." '
The choice of a level-of-generality at which the decision will be
argued and justified necessitates an explanation because of the need
to ground justification in a particular political theory. The political
theory must persuasively legitimate the inherently political basic
values articulated in the exercise of the judicial function. The argu-
ment encapsulated in footnote four of Carolene Products and Jus-
tice Jackson's refusal to allow the Barnette decision to turn on judi-
cial competence, as in the terms of the activism debate or on any
instrumental view of judicial power, suggest that justification of
interpretation, and the inherent accompanying policymaking in the
idea of judgment, must ultimately ground in a set of fundamental
social values. These values must be sufficiently fundamental to ex-
plain simultaneously the authority of the judges vis-'-vis other gov-
ernmental institutions to govern the case, and to explain the choice
of particular reasoned principles which resolve the litigation."7 For
as Justice Stone wrote in Gobitis:
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of
personal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as
they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public good,
and few which have not been directed, as they are now, at politi-
cal!y helpless minorities. The framers were not unaware that
under the system which they created most governmental curtail-
ment of personal liberty would have the support of a legislative
266. 47 F. Supp. at 253.
267. [lIt is arguable that, the more human activity and human personality
are shaped by the forces and pressures of homogenization spawned by mass indus-
try and the mass media-the forces that define culture and constitute the econ-
omy-the less sense it makes to spin out special limits and duties for government
in its dealings with individual persons and groups. In the end, little beyond a
profession of faith can be offered in response to such a perception. The very idea
of a fundamental right of personhood rests on the conviction that even though
one's identity is constantly and profoundly shaped by the rewards and penalties,
the exhortations and scarcities and constraints of one's social environment, the
"personhood" resulting from this'process is sufficiently "one's own" to be deemed
fundamental in confrontation with the one entity that retains a monopoly over
legitimate violence-the government. Thus active coercion by government to alter
a person's being, or deliberate neglect by government which permits a being to
suffer, are conceived as qualitatively different from the passive, incremental coer-
cion that shapes all of life and for which no one bears precise responsibility.
L. TmBE, supra note 84, at 890 (footnote omitted). But see Rehnquist, supra note 11, at 7-8.
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judgment that the public interest would be better served by its
curtailment than by its constitutional protection."8
Maher involved a similar struggle. Majority and minority Jus-
tices split over the nature of the liberty in controversy. The differ-
ence in the characterization of the rights thought to be at stake in
Maher involved a challenge to medicaid programs which subsidized
medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth but not inci-
dent to non-therapeutic abortions. Justice Powell perceived the
issue as whether women have been permitted the opportunity to
choose to have an abortion2"' in the same way that Justice Frank-
furter labeled the consequences of upholding mandatory flag salutes
as the opportunity to choose parochial schools rather than partici-
pate in conditioned public education.""T
Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a state to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.27" '
Like Justices Stone and Jackson, Justice Brennan viewed the issue
as whether the state has the authority to withhold some medical
responses to a physiological condition by failing to pay for selected
medical responses preferred by an individual.
As a practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have
no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the State
will pay for the associated medical services, even though they
would have chosen to have abortions if the State had also pro-
vided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State had pro-
vided funds for neither procedure. This disparity in funding by
the State clearly operates to coerce indigent pregnant women to
bear children they would not otherwise choose to have, and just
as clearly, this coercion can only operate upon the poor, who are
uniquely the victims of this form of financial pressure."'
Significantly, Justice Brennan quoted Justice Frankfurter's recogni-
tion that the lines between inducement and coercion, a problem of
the appropriate level-of-generality with which to measure the loss
of freedom in choosing birth or abortion to terminate pregnancy in
268. 310 U.S. at 604-05 (Stone, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying note 136
supra.
269. 432 U.S. at 476-77.
270. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 657 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
271. 432 U.S. at 473-74.
272. Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the context of conditioned payment, depends upon the class of peo-
ple being affected."'
Justice Powell, however, did not justify his conclusion and rea-
soning that rights are merely opportunities when he failed to explain
why wealth makes no factual difference in the statement of the
claim raised by the real dispute in Maher. Although there exist
political theories upon which Justice Powell might have relied to
explain his concept of rights and thereby to justify the chosen level-
of-generality by which to distinguish the legitimate expectations of
the respondents, his failure to explicitly tie the values of a politics
of opportunity to the realities of poverty renders his opinion inade-
quate. Thus, Judge Friendly cited Justice Blackmun's dissent chas-
tizing Justice Powell for misunderstanding the right involved in
Maher."7 '
There is another world "out there," the existence of which the
court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize, and
so the cancer of poverty will continue to grow. This is a sad day
for those who regard the Constitution as a force that would serve
justice to all evenhandedly, and, in so doing, would better the lot
of the poorest among us.
275
Ultimately, Justice Powell's failure to realistically understand the
threat to liberty created by the governmental interest in the particu-
lar outcome of personal choice leads to a failure to justify the hold-
ing in Maher in the context of an ongoing judicial process of gover-
nance. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Maher charged, "the Court
pulls from thin air a distinction between laws that absolutely pre-
vent exercise of the fundamental right to abortion and those that
'merely' make its exercise difficult for some people. '27
Further indication that Justice Powell failed to understand the
importance of the level-of-generality with which opinions are writ-
ten appears in his opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland."7 He
273. To sanction such a ruthless consequence inevitably resulting from a
money hurdle erected by a State, would justify a latter-day Anatole France to add
one more item to his ironic comments on the "majestic equality" of the law. "The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
274. Friendly, supra note 11, at 33 & n.61.
275. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (companion case
to Maher).
276. Id. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
277. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice
Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion.
[Vol. 33:59
THE JUDGING GLASS
noted that judges should not narrow the scope of constitutional
rights merely because they fear being criticized for judicial interfer-
ence with democratic policymaking.
As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason
for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention be-
come the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and re-
straint. But it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it require
what the city urges here: cutting off any protection of family
rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary-the bound-
ary of the nuclear family."8
Justice Powell then articulated a protection of family rights at the
level-of-generality of the extended family, but separated that hold-
ing from the judicial definition of protected choices which justified
the Court's interference with East Cleveland's zoning: "the choice
of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly
be denied by the state . . . the Constitution prevents East Cleve-
land from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.""2 9
Perhaps, Professor Tribe's discussion of Moore in his treatise280
reaches the point which now appears to be the logical conclusion of
the participants in this symposium but which is actually the point
from which this symposium should have commenced. Professor
Tribe recognized that: "Justice Powell . . . sought escape from the
perils of judicial subjectivity in history and tradition." 8' For Justice
Powell, our society has highly valued the extended family, not only
historically but functionally, "it is through the family that we incul-
cate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural.'"'8 But Professor Tribe criticized Justice Powell's position:
Nor would it be consistent with the rationale of Moore to with-
hold the status of preferred rights . . . from these practices or
institutions that "inculcate and pass down" values that the cur-
rent majority might not deem among its "most cherished," for
the plurality opinion's closing sentence insisted that "the Consti-
tution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children.
Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White
also filed a dissenting opinion.
278. Id. at 502 (Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
279. Id. at 505-06.
280. See L. TmaE supra note 84, at 573 n.5.
281. Id. Justice Powell stated that: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution pro-
tects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." 431 U.S. at 503 (footnote omitted).
282. Id. at 503-06.
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* . ." Both the historical inquiry and the functional analysis
then, must proceed at a level general enough to avoid the trap of
sanctifying the conventional and preventing moral and cultural
change.
283
Professor Tribe offered this analysis as support for the inexorable
conclusion in which the terms of the activism debate have no place:
References to history, tradition, evolving community standards,
and civilized consensus, can provide suggestive parallels and oc-
casional insights, but it is an illusion to suppose that they can
yield answers, much less absolve judges of responsibility for de-
veloping and defending a theory of what rights are "preferred" or
"fundamental" and why. " '
V. CONCLUSION: ALL THE KING'S HORSES AND ALL THE KING'S MEN
So many connections link the speakers in this symposium, the
temptation beckons to see much more in the cross currents than
perhaps can be squared with all their prior decisions, thoughts and
writings. Indeed, a methodological paradox confronts this comment.
The article proceeds by interpretation, as does judicial decision-
making; criticism parallels judgment. The paradox raises the ques-
tion of whether the speakers' thoughts have been perceived and
translated at the right level-of-generality both to be faithful to the
intended communication of the speakers' thoughts and to be coher-
ent in the critical manipulation of the speakers' conclusions.
Answers to that question can be provided at three levels. First,
even in the terms of the traditional judicial activism debate, all
three speakers demonstrated reliance on assumptions which explode
283. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 573 n.5 (citations omitted). For an understanding of the
level-of-generality on which to value the family as an institution, see Gelfand, Authority and
Autonomy: The State, the Individual and the Family, 33 U. MI AI L. REv. 125 (1978).
Justice Rehnquist argued strongly in the symposium that the family as a private institution
should not be subject to governmental interference. See note 88 supra. Although he advanced
no reason for finding institutional or even traditional value only in the nuclear family, Justice
Rehnquist apparently would not extend judicial authority under the open texture of due
process protection beyond this limited definition of the family institution. Despite Justice
Powell's emphasis on the tradition and institution, Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's
dissent in Moore. 431 U.S. at 531-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). And in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion which saw the foster family as purely the creature of the state.
The family life upon which the State "intrudes" is simply a temporary status
which the State itself has created. It is a "family life" defined and controlled by
the law of New York, for which New York pays, and the goals of which New York
is entitled to and does set for itself.
Id. at 863 (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally L. TRIaE, supra note 84, at 987 & n.17A.
284. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 33:59
THE JUDGING GLASS
the notion of judicial deferral. "5 Where conflict between these
speakers on the judiciary evolves into a question of "degree,""2 , the
activism issue can be critically analyzed only by consideration of
differences over natural law, political theory or some other source
of basic values.2"7 The logical end-point of the debate empties Chief
Justice Burger's epithet " of any content. Of course, when people
use words, they mean exactly what they say if they are the masters
of their intent and define communicable ideas. But mastery implies
more than raw power: mastery involves a certain control which de-
pends upon potential recognition by others of the ability of the
master to persuade doubters of the correctness of the perceived
authority by reference to some relevant standard. As Karl Llewellyn
has stated:
The quarrel which one has with the judges is rather that they do
not play sleight-of-hand enough or, better, that their sleight-of-
hand is too often uninspired routine; is not always lit by passion-
ate, conscious battle with the problem of ends and purposes
which presents itself before honest juggling can begin. The only
other quarrel would be that, juggling too often unawares, they
may be dupes of their own magic of yesterday, dupes of the game
instead of its masters, and sometimes fail in their job because the
wizard's hat they play before the multitude seems even to them-
selves to bring forth rabbits, white or pied, by some spontaneous
generation.2"'
Second, in law the fragile mastery of the judiciary depends
upon the credibility of the ongoing judicial process in the generation
of doctrine which resolves disputes, facilitates private action and
sets parameters by reference to basic values on the exercise of both
public and private authority. Thus, the rejection of the terms of the
activism debate, while important in itself, also enables the recovery
of an important understanding of the judicial function, the essence
of which is not simply "just results" and institutional baggage but
rather the articulation of legal rationales in applied situations as the
285. For instance, Judge Friendly assumed that the judiciary must give substantive
content to certain constitutional rights and thus apply notions of social policy. See Friendly,
supra note 11, at 27-28; text accompanying note 109 supra. Justice Rehnquist advised judges
to act with an eye toward the institutional interest in litigation. See text accompanying notes
53-63 supra. Professor Tribe assumed that the judiciary should open itself to members of
politically powerless groups so as to provide the only available proving ground for minority
claims. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
286. See notes 71, 104-08 and accompanying text supra.
287. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 70-79 & 231 supra.
288. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' " LoGicA NONSENSE, supra note t.
289. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 196, at 90-92 (1962).
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form of the decision. Justification, the essence of the judicial func-
tion, follows from interdependence of form, which is determined by
the result, and result, which is reasoned through the form. This
model of judicial decisionmaking possesses a significance indepen-
dent of any determination by the symposium speakers as to its
correctness.20
Third, the judging glass highlights the general problem of inter-
pretation, which in turn forces a recognition of the interdependence
of form and substance, opinion and result. The judging glass de-
mands both interpretation of substance (facts) and interpretation
of form (rules, precedents, open-ended constitutional powers) and
bridges both substance and form by iranslating a characterization
of facts into linguistic claims.29' But more may be implied by under-
standing judicial opinions as the product of a translation of dynamic
reality into principles justified by their integration into a rational
argument. The traditional view of what judges do, service the adver-
sary society with third party neutral dispute resolution,292 myopi-
cally undervalues judging as a political and governmental function.
The legitimacy of this function stems not from its formation like
that of elected legislatures, independent of their institutional prod-
uct, but from the judiciary's own coherence. That is, a judicial
result is justified only when it is a judicial decision, a demonstration
through linguistic argument of the justness of a result whose persu-
asiveness rests on the fundamental values which must be the chosen
basis for the inherent interpretation necessary to judgment of any
kind.
In a constitutional democracy, these values will include those
fundamental liberties which are conceived to be beyond manipula-
tion in the interest of short-term and shifting majorities and the
preservation of shared access to the political process to which direct
authority for policymaking has been granted. The articulation of
fundamental values will necessarily require a notion of institutional
adequacy, in the sense of how judges should act, as suggested by
290. This author's understanding of the substantive impact of form has been greatly
enriched by numerous discussions with my colleague, Patrick 0. Gudridge. For his superb
development of the concepts touched upon here, see P. Gudridge, Notes Toward a Theory of
Legislation (unpublished draft on file in the University of Miami Law Review).
291. Karl Llewellyn labeled his version of this process "situation sense." William Twin-
ing explained that, "exhibition of 'situation sense' involves both steps: the formulation of
principles or policies and the classification of the facts into a general type-fact-situation.
Indeed, it would be artificial and misleading to separate formulation of policy from classifica-
tion of facts, because they are to a large extent interdependent." W. TWINING, KARL LLEWEL-
LYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 222-23 (1973).
292. See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 13.
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Judge Friendly,13 but not in the sense of what to judge in the first
place. The question of how judges should decide cases is inescapably
substantive. Thus, ultimately it is not the justification of results
which necessarily carries all credible judicial decisions back to a
plea for a shared vision of normative political theory," ' but rather
it is the justification of interpretation inhering in the process of
judgment which makes this demand. Yet, because the objects of
interpretation are factors in a process designed to reach a litigated
result, the explanation of the opinion is also the explanation of the
result. The modern Court has simply put the institutional cart be-
fore the constitutional Court.
The reason the Court has become so sensitive about compe-
tence may be obvious; as Professor Bickel has observed, while the
Justices' subject is politics, their subject is also themselves. 9 5 While
the structure of judicial decision of adversary disputes forces self-
investigation, the object of investigation, the crystalization and con-
ceptualization of fundamental values, forces the self-scrutiny or
caution to take the form of policy legislation: What can judges
justifiably do? What jurisdiction they then will possess to define
social values can only be justified by a method of decision which is
the same as a theory of politics. The notion that theory depends
upon practice and perhaps is practice, regardless of its symbolic
representation in language, combines with the notion that judges,
as a part of government, always act in a political manner to produce
a conclusion in which the method of decision and a theory of politics
are related.
Once the judges are seen in public law as the regulators of the
political process, as they are, less controversially, under the com-
mon law the regulators of private orderings,9 6 the important data
for those needing to predict judicial behavior becomes the political,
social and even metaphysical system which can be distilled as a
Court's consciousness from individual judicial actors in dialogue.27
293. E.g., Friendly, supra note 11, passim (courts should observe "procedural fairness"
when relying on social or economic data rather than neutral principles).
294. See Wisotsky, supra note 51, at 204.
295. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 88-98 (1962). Professor Bickel con-
cluded that the activism concept of literal absolutes is merely an illusion promulgated by
judges who seek to avoid responsibilities for the actual policies they make. He also saw beyond
that illusion to the central feature of judicial policymaking: personal convictions.
296. See generally Friendly, supra note 11.
297. Given the necessity of a resort to politics in interpreting legal language, the open
texture of the constitutional provisions focuses attention on a collective essence of individual
assumptions: "[Blills of right seem always to have depended ... on the existence of a broad
region of interpretation within which court decisions and administrative and legislative action
have worked progressively to a practical definition and within divergent philosophies have
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Through his or her opinions, each judge, consciously or not, con-
verses with other judges, legislative and executive officers, litigants
and the public about what principles of social organization can
permissably be constructed by the society in that era of time."'
Justice Jackson clearly understood the role of the Supreme Court:
"The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is nothing less than
the arbitration between fundamental and ever-present rival forces
or trends in our organized society. The technical tactics of constitu-
tional lawsuits are part of a greater strategy of statecraft in our
system.""'9
This function is constitutional; it is inescapable; it cannot be
deferred, and it can only be disguised and not forsaken in institu-
tional arguments.N Those judges who would persist in disclaiming
responsibility for mastery over their own words or their understand-
ings of their own decisional process do more than deliver an incom-
plete service and an ungrounded opinion; they set the judicial func-
tion and with it, the concept of ordered liberty, rocking on a thin
wall of social cohesiveness. As this commentator has argued pre-
viously, 0' a society regulated by a legal form may be stable either
because the norms of relationships are truly shared to a high if
approximate degree or, momentarily, because the norms are im-
posed or chosen sub silentio. However, when the individual's worth
and dignity stem from the importance of the individual to the so-
ciety, even if that instrumental value stems from membership in a
worked to less ambiguous or conflicting theoretic bases." McKeon, The Philosophic Bases
and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man, in HUMAN RIGHTS 35, 46 (UNESCO ed.
1949).
298. See Wisotsky, supra note 51, at 197.
299. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 311-12 (1941).
300. For example, note how the problem of generality has become translated from a
substantive problem of the reach of a constitutional protection into an institutional question
of standing by Justice Rehnquist in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976):
The logical consequences of the Court's decision in the case, a decision which
elevates commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer
seeking to strike a bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for
the free marketplace of ideas, are far reaching indeed . . . .This effort to reach
a result which the Court obviously considers desirable is a troublesome one, for
two reasons. It extends standing to raise First Amendment claims beyond the
previous decisions of this Court. It also extends the protection of that Amendment
to purely commercial endeavors which its most vigorous champions on this Court
had thought to be beyond its pale.
Similarly, aspects of class actions in civil procedure are determined by characterization
of the factual need to prefer class litigation to case by case adjudication in the same way that
guarantees of procedural due process gain content by the variable need to individualize notice
and hearing. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1318, 1370-71
(1976). See also text accompanying note 259 supra.
301. Casebeer, supra note 105, at 693.
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traditional private institution, then the resulting differential treat-
ment of minorities and individuals, which creates a perceived domi-
nation, risks the very fabric of communication which order is in-
tended to preserve. Thus, it would be perverse to fail to see the
importance of justification as critical to judicial functioning. The
key to the genesis of shared values'0 and truly ordered liberty"3 can
only be reached when domination gives way to the full recognition
of social interdependence, and liberty is both generous and general
enough to accommodate competing tastes, lifestyles and thus vi-
sions of the future of the society. Thus, Justice Jackson quoted
Thomas Paine: "'He that would make his own liberty secure must
guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty
he establishes a precedent that will reach himself.' "304
In this sense, the path leads back to Barnette once more, and
to the Justices who understood our times much more clearly than
do the Justices of the present Court. Justice Frankfurter wielded the
judging glass toward a situation of compelled flag salutes and found
the necessary preconditions for liberty in order built on patriotism.
As he wrote in Gobitis, so he would believe in Barnette:
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of
cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those
agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the
traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to genera-
tion, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common
life which constitutes a civilization. "We live by symbols
" t305
Justice Jackson grasped the glass and saw more clearly a danger to
that very cohesion and the interdependence of common life:
A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and
what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and
scorn. . . . If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
302. R. UNGER, supra note 209, at 100-03.
303. The phrase "ordered liberty" was also used in dealing with the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. See. e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
149 n.13 (1968).
The term is used here not in reference to the incorporation doctrine but rather to illus-
trate the sort of ideal society envisioned by Professor Tribe in Seven Pluralist Fallacies. Tribe,
supra note 8. Of course, the "ordered liberty" of the incorporation doctrine pointed toward
the same general conception of social values.
304. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (quoting V. BROOKS, THE WORLD OF
WASHINGTON IRVING 57 n.(1944)).
305. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). See text accompanying
note 159 supra.
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be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.m
A common life will never exist, let alone be treasured, by command
or by the instrumental sacrifice of the symbols by which men,
women and even children define themselves.
Society through the judging glass and social values defined by
its focusing must continue to make sense to virtually all members
of our society, lest the wind of dissent from law's new "'ene-
mies' "m tip the teetering judicial function, like Humpty Dumpty,
from its perch so that we are left muttering about judges, as Lewis
Carroll left Alice muttering upon parting company with Humpty
Dumpty-" 'of all the unsatisfactory people I ever met-' [Alice]
never finished the sentence, for at this moment a heavy crash shook
the forest from end to end."30 8
306. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33, 642 (1943).
307. For the use of the word "enemies," see Tribe, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting 3 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF EDMUND BURKE 387 (T. Copeland ed. 1958)).
308. LOGicAL NONSENSE, supra note t, at 209.
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